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ABSTRACT:
This study will use three types of multivariate regression analysis to examine the
relationship between Grand Strategy Choice and Relative Military and Economic Power.
Understanding the effects of the relative distribution of available means on a nation’s choice of
grand strategy is important, because if they are significant, it may be possible to predict the
behavior of great powers, based on an examination of their available means.
The first model uses a logit analysis to look at the effect of a series of lagged independent
variables on whether a great power adopts a Pro or Anti Status Quo posture. The second model
uses a time series multivariate OLS regression model to analyze the effect of the same
independent variables on the Risk of Major War which a great power assumes the following
year. The third model combines the first two models by using a robust multinomial logit analysis
to examine the effect of the lagged independent variables on the odds of a great power adopting
each of the four overarching Grand Strategies the following year.
Taken together the results of the three models indicate that both relative military and
economic strength as well as structural variables (including: nation age, government type,
primary economic system and others) were statistically significant predictors of grand strategy
choice. However, the relationship between the variables and strategy choice is highly complex.
For example, in the case of the United States, detailed analysis of the data demonstrates that
internal variables work primarily to limit the acceptable strategy choices, while specific
strategies are then chosen from the acceptable options based on a country’s strategic position at
the time. This interaction is then further complicated during periods of great societal stress,
during which policy may shift from the predicted approach for a period of time before snapping
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back to the predicted approach after several years. In addition, the three statistical models also
provide some statistical evidence in support of democratic peace theory, Jervis’ security dilemma
(including the idea of offense - defense balance),1 as well as Organski and Kugler’s theory of
great power conflict.2
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Preface:
Isaac Newton famously wrote “[i]f I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders
of Giants”3 and while this is true of all researchers and to some extent all research, it is
particularly true in this case as the goal of this work is to create a more stable and sound platform
upon the shoulders of those giants for future researchers to stand and see yet further. It should
come as no surprise then that this work owes its existence to the hard work of many people both
theorists and researchers from a wide variety of disciplines. There are far too many to be able to
mention each by name. I am eternally grateful to each of them.
However, there are a few people who have played a major role in directing and
supporting this project who must be acknowledged. The first is my advisor, Kenneth Thomas, a
true friend and mentor, who among a great many other things, was the one who first suggested I
consider grand strategy as a topic for my dissertation. I would also like to thank the rest of my
committee: David Kimball, David Robertson and Brian Fogarty for all their help not only with
this project, but throughout my time as a graduate student, without their guidance I would never
have made it this far. I would also like to thank both the Graduate School and the Department of
Political Science at the University of Missouri Saint Louis for their generous financial support.
Finally, I would like to thank my family, and in particular, my parents, for their unwavering
support and infinite patience.
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Chapter 1
Introduction:
In 2013 when the research for this project began, the probability of a modern great power
conflict seemed unbelievably remote, and the United States seemed set to dominate as the
world’s only superpower for at least another decade. However, the last few years have seen a
dizzying array of challenges, including the Russian occupation of Crimea, the diplomatic
struggle over the South China Sea, the fraying of the European Union and the continued spread
of radicalism and terrorism around the world. This series of challenges is only made more
disturbing by the increasing unwillingness by the U.S. to bear additional burdens to preserve the
current world order and the increasing power of nationalist movements around the world. All of
this means that it is increasingly likely that we will see a multipolar world soon, and with it will
likely come a return of great power politics, and inevitably, great power conflict. Thus, the need
to study and understand the way states formulate their overall strategies for dealing with one
another is of greater importance than it has been at any time since the 1930’s. In particular, it is
important to remember that the failure to understand and predict the strategies of other great
powers has played a major role in the lead up to some of the most destructive conflicts humanity
has ever seen, including, but by no means limited to World War I and World War II.
It is to better understand what motivates a great power to choose a specific overall
strategy (what is commonly referred to as a grand strategy) that is at the heart of this research
project. The term grand strategy is a nebulous one with many different uses, but for the purposes
of this paper we will be construing it to mean the way a nation uses its combined military,
economic and political power, in both peacetime and war, to attain what B.H. Liddell Heart
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called “a better peace.”4 Furthermore, most scholars in the field see a nation’s choice of grand
strategy as a balancing act between a nation’s desire for security, its desire for prosperity, and the
limited means available to secure these ends.5 In considering grand strategy, it is important to
remember that the means which can be employed run the gamut from economic investment and
trade, to multinational treaties, to ‘general’ (i.e. unlimited) war.
In studying grand strategy, the emphasis has, so far, been on what factors (internal or
external) have led to the adoption of specific grand strategies by specific administrations and
examining whether these strategies have been successful in achieving their immediate stated
goals, especially with respect to prosecuting a major war or staving off national decline.
However, while a country’s grand strategy may fluctuate swiftly during these transformational
periods, in less turbulent times a nation’s grand strategy may be relatively consistent for long
periods of time with only minor variations in approach, and thus behave in a highly path
dependent manner (North, 1990)6. This is because implementing grand strategy often requires
making decisions with significant sunk costs and creating economic, political, military and social
institutions to support the nation’s goals. To put it another way, if grand strategy is, as many
scholars argue, a question of balancing means and ends, it should surprise no one that the means
available to confront any specific crisis are likely to have been determined by decisions made
long before, except in cases where a nation makes significant efforts to reorient itself.
Determining which combination of means a country will use, and to what ends these means will
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be applied, is a political question of the first order. Yet it is also a choice which must respect
significant constraints in terms of the means available at the time and may entail considerable
sunk costs for the future, thus limiting a nation’s ability to freely choose.
My central question is: do relative military and economic power determine strategy
choice, and if so, how is a country’s choice of grand strategy affected by the relative distribution
of means (military, economic, etc.) available at the time when the decision is made? The reason
why understanding the effects of the relative distribution of available means on a nation’s choice
of grand strategy is so important, is that if they have a significant effect, it may be possible to
gain insight into the behavior of a country, not only in the present but also in the future, based on
an examination of its available means. This insight could in turn impact the way we assess
everything from a revolutionary government’s potential to turn into a rogue state, to the policies
we recommend to encourage a poor country’s economic development, to how likely a state is to
respect international law and abide by treaties.
Even more importantly, when it comes to avoiding a future great power war, a better
understanding of the factors leading to a nation’s choice of grand strategy can help us determine
which situations are most likely to lead to the rise of a revisionist state and how to prevent them.
Eventually, this could allow resources and attention to be focused on those states at high risk of
becoming a danger to other states in the international system, as well as providing the specific
policy changes needed to redirect those states into becoming productive members of the
international community. Furthermore, whether such a model succeeds or fails can tell us a great
deal about the potential validity of the realist theories of grand strategy and about the importance
of the tested factors in determining the behavior of states. This will in turn improve our
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understanding not only of grand strategy, but of international relations in general, by exposing
which factors underpin a country’s choice of grand strategy.
This study used three types of multivariate regression analysis to examine the relationship
between Grand Strategy Choice and Relative Military and Economic Power, while controlling
for other factors. My main hypothesis (𝐻1 ) was that as Relative Economic Power increases,
countries will have a higher probability of choosing Pro Status Quo strategies (Interventionism
and Legalism). My second hypothesis (𝐻2 ) was that as Relative Military Power increases,
countries are more likely to choose High Risk strategies (namely Interventionism or
Revisionism). These hypotheses were tested not only in terms of the Accepted Risk of War and
whether a country chooses to be Pro or Anti Status Quo, but also by examining the effects on
each of the four primary Grand Strategies individually.
The first model used a robust logit analysis to look at the effect of a series of lagged
independent variables on whether a great power adopts a Pro or Anti Status Quo posture. The
second model used a time series multivariate OLS regression model to analyze the effect of the
same independent variables on the Risk of Major War which a great power assumes the
following year. Finally, the third model combined the first two models by using a robust
multinomial logit analysis to examine the effect of the lagged independent variables on the odds
of a great power adopting each of the four overarching Grand Strategies the following year.
Overall, if proponents of realist models of grand strategy are correct, then after
controlling for other factors, positional variables such as: Relative Numbers of Military
Personnel, Relative Military Spending, Relative GDP, Relative GDP per Capita and Homeland
Vulnerability, should have a statistically and substantively significant effect on Grand Strategy
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Choice. On the other hand, if proponents of constructivist models of Grand Strategy Choice are
correct, then institutional and societal variables like Government Type, Economic System,
Nation Age and Polity2 Score will be statistically and substantively significant.
To minimize the potential complexity of the system being examined, it was decided to
use data only from great powers and to focus exclusively on their strategy for dealing with other
great powers. This eliminates potential multi-level issues where the strategies of lesser states
could be influenced by the wishes of more powerful ‘patron’ states. Furthermore, the potential
for a major war which could threaten the survival of a great power means that one would expect
the grand strategies chosen by a great power, with respect to other such powers, to be as
carefully thought out and rational as possible. Finally, great powers have some of the best
developed bureaucracies and thus offer the most complete data available for the longest possible
duration. In this study, data from all the great powers in existence from 1892 to 2012 was used
with the exception of China since its economic and military data is too unreliable to be
incorporated at this time.
Analysis of the data indicates that while both structural and positional variables were
statistically significant predictors of grand strategy choice, the relationship between the variables
and strategy choice is highly complex. Furthermore, analysis of the data indicates that internal
variables may work to limit the acceptable strategy choices, while specific strategies are chosen
from the acceptable options based on a country’s strategic position at the time. This interaction
can be further complicated during periods of great societal stress, which can result in periods
where policy shifts from the predicted approach before snapping back to the predicted approach
after several years.

9

In addition, the three statistical models also have significant implications for some
related political science theories including democratic peace theory, Jervis’ security dilemma
including the idea of offense - defense balance, 7 Organski and Kugler’s theory of great power
conflict, 8 and Mearsheimer’s offensive realism.9 Starting with democratic peace theory, both
Model 2 and Model 3 provide statistically significant evidence linking democracies with greater
odds of adopting lower risk and more pro status quo grand strategies. Moving on to Jervis’s
concept of offense / defense balance, all three statistical models provided evidence that force
structure, and not just size or funding, had a statistically and substantively significant impact on
grand strategy choice. With the positive relationship between increased Military Expenditures
per Personnel and the greater likelihood of perusing high risk and anti-status quo strategies
indicating that the more capital intensive a military is, the greater the willingness to risk a major
war. In addition, Model 3 showed a significant relationship between Homeland Vulnerability
and the odds a nation will pursue a Legalist Grand Strategy, providing some additional evidence
for Jervis’ security dilemma. Next, Looking at Organski and Kugler’s theory of great power
conflict, both Model 2 and Model 3 supported their conclusions, both showing a positive
relationship between relative economic power and the pursuit of high risk grand strategies. This
was further supported by the fact that all three models found a statistically significant negative
relationship between a great power’s age and the odds of adopting a high risk, anti-status quo
strategy the following year. Taken together this provides significant support for Organski and
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Kugler’s argument that rising powers are most likely to start a great power conflict. Finally, the
model provides mixed results with respect to Mearshimer’s theory of offensive realism, for while
the models did not find a clear relationship between overall relative military power and choosing
high risk strategies (Revisionist or Interventionist), Model 2 and 3 did find a positive relationship
between relative economic power and the likelihood of adopting a high-risk strategy the
following year, all other factors being equal.
This will all be covered in greater detail in the following chapters, beginning with a
review of the current state of the literature in Chapter 2, from its beginnings following World
War II to the present day, along with a discussion of the current divide between realist and
constructivist theories of grand strategy choice. Next, Chapter 3 will discuss the research
methodology adopted by this study including the main hypothesis to be tested, the meaning and
construction of the dependent and independent variables to be tested and the techniques which
will be used to test the two hypotheses. This will be followed by a more detailed discussion of
the data, its sources and organization in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 will give the statistically significant
results of the three models in table form as well as some discussion of the statistically significant
results to provide some context. Chapter 6 will then take Model 3’s predictions for the United
States and compare them to a timeline of important U.S. foreign policy events, showing how the
complex results of model 3 work together in a real world historical example. Chapter 7 will show
the Model 3 predictions for the remaining great powers in the study, along with some brief
analysis. Finally, Chapter 8 will discuss the overall results of the three models with respect to the
two hypotheses, as well the implications for some related theories and future research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter will discuss the current state of the grand strategy literature from its
beginnings following World War II to the present day with an examination of the current divide
between realist and constructivist theories of grand strategy choice. It will also examine some of
the many contributions made to the field of grand strategy research from other areas of political
science research. Finally, it will conclude with a discussion of some of the ways quantitative
analysis techniques have been used to examine questions in areas closely related to grand
strategy choice and for which the models presented in this paper may help shed some additional
light.
The field of grand strategy is a highly fractured one, almost entirely lacking in formalized
models, and even common definitions. Historically, while some scholars of grand strategy trace
the origins of their field to Clausewitz’s On War, others, including Paul Kennedy (1991) and
Williamson Murry (2011), see Clausewitz as being too focused on the battlefield, and instead
argue that the modern study of grand strategy begins with works like Edward Mead Earle’s
Makers of Modern Strategy (1943) and Basil Liddell Hart’s Strategy (1974).10 Earle’s 1943
collection, Makers of Modern Strategy, is important because, according to Paul Kennedy (1991),
Earle was the first to expand the definition of grand strategy to include all of a nation’s
resources, in peacetime as well as in wartime.11 Earle’s view of grand strategy can be most
clearly seen in his introduction to Makers of Modern Strategy, in which he wrote:

10

See: Kennedy, Paul. 1991. Grand Strategies in War and Peace. New Haven: Yale. p. 1-4. and:
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In the present-day world, then, strategy is the art of controlling and utilizing the
resources of a nation—or a coalition of nations—including its armed forces, to the
end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against
enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed. The highest type of strategy—
sometimes called grand strategy—is that which so integrates the policies and
armaments of the nation that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is
undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.12
In 1974 B.H. Liddell Hart, took the next important step towards the modern conception of grand
strategy in his book Strategy, which examines the successful strategies employed in wars
extending from those of the ancient Greeks through that of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49.13 His
primary contribution to the study of grand strategy was that he was the first to articulate the idea
that the central problem in grand strategy is how to balance a nation’s desired ends with its
available means, as well as being the first to argue that the desired end of war is not simply
military victory, but creating and sustaining a more favorable peace.14 When taken together, Hart
and Earle form the conceptual basis for the modern realist approach to understanding grand
strategy formation.
Other important contributions to the field of grand strategy have been made by theorists
looking at other areas of international relations, including the structure of international relations,
game theory, trade, international political economy and national security. These include Kenneth
Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979), which argues that in the absence of any power
capable of enforcing commitments between states, nations operate in an anarchic or ‘self-help’
system and as result, he concludes that the most stable international system would consist of the
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fewest number of major powers with the greatest possible concentration of power in comparison
to other states in the system.15 This conclusion is challenged by several of the authors included in
Kenneth Oye’s Cooperation under Anarchy (1986), in which game theoretic methods are used to
examine various conditions under which the fundamentally anarchic nature of international
relations may be overcome.16 One example with significant implications for grand strategy is
Robert Jervis’s chapter “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security
Cooperation” which concludes that in periods following a conflict with a potential hegemon,
“Anarchy and the security dilemma do not prevent a relatively high level of cooperation in the
form of a concert system.”17
Another important work examining interstate cooperation is Stephen Walt’s The Origins
of Alliances (1990), which argues for a “Balance of threat” approach, concluding that:
[S]tates balance against the states that pose the greatest threat, and the latter need
not be the most powerful states in the system. Just as national power is produced
by several different components (e.g., military and economic capability, national
resources and population), the level of threat that a state poses to others is the
product of several interrelated components. Whereas balance of power theory
predicts that states will react to imbalances of power, balance of threat theory
predicts that when there is an imbalance of threat (i.e., when one state or coalition
appears especially dangerous), states will form alliances or increase their internal
efforts in order to reduce their vulnerability.18
This is important because it helps to explain the alliance behavior of smaller states and the logic
behind the pursuit of both revisionist and interventionist grand strategies by larger states

15
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(especially the interventionist policy of containment as adopted by the U.S.).19 Another work
contributing to our understanding of state behavior is Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft,
Interdependence and National Security edited by Blanchard et al (2000) in which authors
examine the relationship between international trade and national security.20 One chapter with
implications for grand strategy formation is “Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace” by
Dale C. Copeland, who attempts to explain the period of détente (1970-1974) and the end of the
cold war (1985-1991) by focusing on the effect a country’s expectation of future trade may have
on their adoption of a peaceful versus aggressive strategy.21 Together the above works lay out
some of the implications for strategy choice arising from relative state power, international
norms, trade, and multinational cooperation.
Furthermore, the problem of relating means to ends is a common one in international
relations literature, especially in the closely related field of hegemony and hegemonic decline,
which has focused on the ability of the most powerful states in the international system to
maintain their economic, military and strategic superiority. Examples of this kind of research
include: Krasner’s “State Power and the Structure of International Trade” (1976) which uses a
combination of historical analysis and empirical data to conclude that “hegemony leads to a more
open trading structure….”22 Gilpin’s US Power and the Multinational Corporation (1975) which

19

Walt, Stephen M. 1990. The Origins of Alliances. Kindle Edition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kindle Edition,
Location 531-805.
20
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21

Copeland, Dale C. 2000. “Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace: Détente 1970—74 and The End of The
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argues that foreign direct investment (while providing some important initial advantages to the
investing country) can, over time, cause the ‘periphery’ to develop at the cost of the international
system’s ‘core’ countries, which can cause dependency on the periphery and increase
international tensions, among other effects.23 And Ikenberry’s “The Future of the Liberal World
Order” (2011) which argues that the increasing power of what were once countries in the
‘periphery’ marks not the failure of the western system of free trade but its ultimate success with
more and more nations developing by buying into the system lead by the ‘core’ nations (in
particular the United States).24
Examining the current literature on grand strategy, most authors follow one of two
primary approaches: ‘realist’ approaches, and what Colin Dueck terms in Reluctant Crusaders
(2006) as “constructivist” approaches.25 The realist approach views grand strategy as being
primarily determined by forces originating outside of the state, while the constructivist approach
views the most important factors as arising from within the state. Authors in each of these
traditions have primarily relied on historical sources, including written reports and memoirs, as
well as later analysis of the historical record and have incorporated theories from other areas of
political science including international relations, political economy, and others. However,
within each of these overarching traditions there are significant differences between authors over
which factors, or combination of factors, are most important and about how much weight to give
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to the factors put forward by the other school. There have also been hybrid approaches, such as
those based on Peter Gourevitch’s 1978 paper “The Second Image Reversed” which argues:
The international system is not only a consequence of domestic politics and
structures but a cause of them. Economic relations and military pressures constrain
an entire range of domestic behaviors, from policy decisions to political forms.
International relations and domestic politics are so interrelated that they should be
analyzed simultaneously, as wholes.26
Examples of the realist approach to analyzing grand strategy include studies by John Hattendorf
(1991) “Alliance, Encirclement, and Attrition”,27 Michael Howard (1991) “British Grand
Strategy in World War I,28 and Eliot Cohen (1991) “Churchill and Coalition Strategy in World
War II,”29 each of which analyzed the grand strategies of coalition building and encirclement
used with great success by Great Brittan in the War of Spanish Succession (Hattendorf), World
War I (Howard) and World War II (Cohen), using historical case studies.
Other studies have focused on using the realist approach to try to understand the reasons
why some grand strategies have failed spectacularly, due to an inability to balance means with
ends. These include Dale Copeland’s (2012) study: “Economic Interdependence and the Grand
Strategies of Germany and Japan, 1925-1941” which examined the effect of declining trade
expectations and high trade dependence on the grand strategy of Germany and Japan leading up
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to World War II, and argues that the collapse of future trade expectations post 1929 lead to the
adoption of more expansionistic and aggressive policies by both states. 30 Steven Lobell’s
“Britain’s Grand Strategy during the 1930s From Balance of Power to Components of Power”
(2012) argues using historical sources that the failed British grand strategy of the interwar years
was the result of an attempt by the British to use component level power balancing, as opposed
to traditional overall power balancing, in an attempt to deal with the combination of limited
resources and a highly competitive security environment.31 Similarly, Norrin M. Ripsman and
Jack S. Levy (2012) also use historical sources in “British Grand Strategy and the Rise of
Germany, 1933-1936” to conclude that the failure of Britain to prevent the rise of Nazi Germany
was the result of a well-intentioned, but failed, attempt to balance a number of threats to the
British empire (including the rise of the Japanese navy in the east as well as Germany in Europe)
while strictly limiting military spending to preserve the Empire’s long term economic viability. 32
Furthermore, the problem of balancing ends and means was by no means limited to the allies. Per
Tsuyoshi Kawaski’s case study “The Rising Sun Was No Jackal” (2012), the primary Japanese
motivation behind joining the Tripartite Pact was primarily to balance against rising U.S. power
in the Pacific, and not bandwagoning on German success in Europe.33 Other works have
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examined the relationship between military as well as economic factors and grand strategy,
including: Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1989), which uses some 500
years of the historical record to examine “the interaction between economics and strategy” and
concluding that in the long run a nation’s economic power and military power are heavily
interconnected, but that the relationship is not necessarily deterministic and may lag
significantly.34 As well as Shaped by War and Trade by Ira Katznelson and Martin Shefter
(2002), which includes several chapters on ways that military and economic power has effected
the development of the United States.35 For example, Martin Schefter’s chapter “War, Trade, and
U.S. Party Politics” uses the historical record to examine some of the ways external forces have
affected the development of party politics in the United States.36
However, constructivist scholars have a very different view of the primary motivators of
grand strategy, focusing instead on internal factors such as ideology and institutional effects.
Examples include two articles on the importance of ideology in explaining Soviet grand strategy,
one by Condoleezza Rice (1991)37 and another by Mark L. Hass (2012)38, both of which argue
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that communist ideology heavily influenced Soviet grand strategy during the period leading up to
World War II and throughout the Cold War. Other constructivist studies include Arther Ferrill’s
(1991) study attributing the decline of the Roman Empire to an unwillingness on the part of
Roman citizens to make the necessary sacrifices in terms of both taxation and military service
required to maintain the empire;39 and a study by Dennis Showalter (1991) arguing that the
German lack of an effective grand strategy was largely a result of the professionalization and
separation of the German military and diplomatic services, with the resulting
compartmentalization of their areas of responsibility leading to lack of communication and an
inability to balance military means to political ends.40
Ultimately, the realist and constructivist approaches are not necessarily mutually
exclusive, and a number of studies have used hybrid approaches. One example is a study by
Peter Jackson (2012) which argues that both external factors (shifting balance of power in
Europe, lack of British engagement) and internal factors (war weariness, etc.) were equally
important in explaining changes in French grand strategy leading up to World War II.41 Another
is J.H. Elliott’s (1991) study on the decline of Imperial Spain, which argues that it was a
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combination of domestic factors (fear of decline) along with a changing external balance of
power that caused Olivares to attempt a high risk grand strategy which ultimately failed. 42
There have also been a few attempts to create overall models of grand strategy formation.
Examples include: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2003) by John Mearsheimer, who
contends that as a result of the anarchic nature of the international system great powers are
forced to seek ways “to maximize their share of world power” what he calls “offensive
realism.”43 Steven E. Lobell’s book, The Challenge of Hegemony (2005), argues that the
recursive interaction between the external economic / security environment, and the specific
domestic coalitions which the external environment empowers, determines the grand strategy
chosen by a declining hegemon and how effectively that hegemon will be able to stave off
decline.44 Kevin Narizny’s (2007) book, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy, argues that
the grand strategy adopted by a state is driven at its most fundamental level by the preferences of
domestic groups (arising primarily from individual economic interests), preferences which are
then constrained by various international and domestic factors, and finally, are aggregated by
national leaders.45 Narizny’s work takes a similar view of grand strategy to that of Peter
Trubowitz who in Politics and Strategy argues for an “executive choice” model of grand strategy
formation, where a nation’s grand strategy is primarily determined by two variables:
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“geopolitical slack” which is based on how secure a country’s position is against external threats
and “party pressure” which represents domestic incentives and is a combination of several
internal factors.46 Finally, in Reluctant Crusaders, Colin Dueck (2006) argues that grand strategy
is driven primarily by international concerns, but is constrained to only a subset of the possible
strategy choices by a nations ‘strategic culture’ due to the need for public buy in.47
However, each of these prior studies has significant limitations. The primary problem
with Lobell’s book is that it focuses exclusively on the period of decline at the end of a nation’s
time as a great power. This ignores both the role of long term structural and institutional effects,
which may be a result of the way the hegemon rose to power in the first place, making it more a
theory about the causes of eventual decline, not about the way states formulate grand strategies.
With respect to Narizny’s work, it is focused primarily on times of peace, uses an approach
based primarily on domestic political factors, and has never been tested using quantitative
methods. Both Trubowitz and Dueck base their work on a detailed analysis of a single
democratic state and as with Narizny, the relative importance of the external versus internal
factors is not clear. Finally, none of the previous models, including Mearshimer’s have ever been
quantitatively tested. These issues mean there is still a need for a more formal model of grand
strategy selection which can be quantitatively verified and objectively applied.
While uncommon, the use of statistical analysis techniques to examine important
questions in international relations is by no means unique to this study. In particular, there are
two previous studies which have used quantitative methodologies to examine theories with
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significant implications for understanding grand strategy formation and for which the model
results presented in this study may help to shed some additional light. The first is “democratic
peace theory” as examined by James Lee Ray in Democracy and International Conflict (1995).48
In Democracy and International Conflict Ray uses a combination of theoretical, statistical and
historical analysis to examine regime change as well as the question of whether democracies
have ever gone to war with one another. Of particular interest to this study is Ray’s conclusion
that so far, he has not been able to find any examples of major wars waged by fully implemented
democracies against each other.49 If the democratic peace theory is accurate, then one would
expect democracies to prefer low risk and pro status quo strategies. A conclusion upon which
which the quantitative models used in this study may be able to shed some light, and one which
if accurate would lend weight to constructivist theories of grand strategy formation. The second
study is Organski and Kugler’s The War Ledger (1980), which examines the effects of changes
in the international distribution of national power on the risk a major (or hegemonic) war will
occur.50 In The War Ledger Organski and Kugler conclude that:
The dominant nation and the challenger are very likely to wage war on one another
whenever the challenger overtakes in power the dominant nation. It is this shift that
destabilizes the system and begins the slide toward war. The speed with which a
challenger overtakes the dominant nation is also important: the faster one country
overtakes the other, the greater the risk of war. These are necessary but not
sufficient conditions…. Fighting begins, then, as a result of differential rates of
growth between the contenders; and it subsequently assumes the proportions of a
world war because of the obligations the major powers in each coalition have
toward their respective leaders. 51
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To reach this conclusion, Organski and Kugler examine a great deal of historical empirical data
on the political, economic and military facets of national power, using a variety of statistical
analysis techniques.52 While the models in this study are not specifically set up to test their
hypotheses, if Organski and Kugler’s conclusions are accurate than one would expect that states
which have only recently achieved great power status, and which have above average military
and economic power, would be more likely to adopt revisionist strategies. Another theory closely
related to the field of grand strategy which this study’s quantitative models may be able to
provide some insight into, although one which has not as of yet been statistically tested, is the
“security dilemma” presented by Robert Jervis, who uses a combination of game theory and
historical record to argue that actions taken by a state intending to increase its security may in
many cases decrease it by increasing the apparent threat of that state to its neighbors, causing
them to respond in kind. 53 Of particular importance to this study is Jervis’s concept of an
offensive-defensive balance and the idea that the prevailing military technology of the time may
have a significant impact on how a state can go about increasing its security. 54 It is this concept
of offense-defense balance which is incorporated into the Relative Military Expenditures Per
Personnel, and was added to the thee models in the study to help to separate the effect of overall
Relative Military Strength from the potential effects of having different types of military forces
at a nations disposal.
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This chapter has examined the current state of the field of grand strategy research. In
addition, it is clear just how much the field depends on contributions from the whole spectrum of
political science research, which may not be surprising given the overarching nature of grand
strategy research. This chapter also shows the theoretical roots of the variables tested by the three
models and makes it clear that this is by no means the first attempt to use quantitative techniques
to shed light on aspects of grand strategy choice.
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Chapter 3:
Research Methodology
This chapter will discuss the research methodology adopted by this study including the
main hypothesis to be tested, the meaning and construction of the dependent and independent
variables to be tested and the techniques which will be used to test the two hypotheses. This
study will use three types of multivariate regression analysis to examine the relationship between
grand strategy choice and relative military and economic power, while controlling for other
factors. My main hypothesis (𝐻1 ) is that as relative economic power increases, countries will
have a higher probability of choosing pro status quo strategies (Interventionism and Legalism).
This hypothesis is based on the idea that states which are winning (here doing well
economically) under the current world order will be less likely to challenge the status quo. My
second hypothesis (𝐻2 ) is that as relative military power increases, countries are more likely to
choose high risk strategies (namely Interventionism or Revisionism). This is in line with
offensive realism and the idea that more militarized states will be inclined to pursue higher risk
strategies to achieve their goals. These hypotheses will be tested not only in terms of the
accepted risk of war and whether a country chooses to be pro or anti status quo, but also by
examining the effects on each of the four primary grand strategies individually. This leads to two
null hypotheses: the first (HN1) is that there will be no exhibited relationship between relative
economic power and the odds a state will be pro rather than anti-status quo. The second null
hypotheses (HN2) is that increases in relative military power will exhibit no relationship to the
risk of war a nation assumes.
This study uses three different models with different regression techniques to analyze the
effect of relative economic and military power on grand strategy choice. The first model uses a
time series logit analysis to look at the effect of a series of lagged independent variables on
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whether a power adopts a pro or anti-status quo posture. The second model uses a time series
multivariate OLS regression model to analyze the effect of the same independent variables on the
risk of major war which a great power assumes the following year. The third model combines the
first two models by using a multinomial logit analysis with robust standard errors to examine the
effect of the lagged independent variables on the odds of a nation adopting each of the four
overarching grand strategies the following year.
The dependent variable for the first model, whether a country is Anti-status Quo, is a
dummy variable coded 1 if a nation is attempting to dramatically change its place in the current
world order (ex. going from minor to major power, or going from major power to hegemon) at
the expense of another power, or if a nation makes significant efforts to isolate itself from the
current world order. The dependent variable for the second model is the Probability of a Major
War, and was generated from a time series multivariate logit analysis using a dummy dependent
variable coded 1 for years a country was involved in a major war, and independent lagged
dummy variables coded 1 for years a country used the following strategies: Voluntary War,
Binding, Blackmail / Subversion, Bloodletting, Internal Balancing, External Balancing, Buck
passing / Retrenchment, Appeasement and Bandwagoning. Finally, the third dependent variable,
Grand Strategy, was coded based on the following table; using the first two dependent variables,
with the cut off for high risk being the acceptance of a non-trivial (1% or higher) probability of a
major war occurring the following year, based on the combination of sub strategies chosen. 55 The
Grand Strategy variable represents a simplified version of Trubowitz’s typography of grand
strategies found in his book Politics and Strategy, with his eleven listed strategies condensed
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down to four overarching strategies. These in turn reflect the structure Trubowitz used to
categorize his strategies, and was done in order to vastly simplify the number of possible
combinations which would be addressed in the multinomial logit analysis in model three.56

Table 1: Grand Strategy Chosen
Anti Status Quo

Pro Status Quo

High Risk

Revisionist

Interventionist

Low Risk

Isolationist / Neutral

Legalist

With respect to the independent variables, all three models use lagged versions of the
following variables: relative military expenditure, relative military personnel, relative GDP,
relative GDP per capita, nation age, homeland vulnerability, government type, economic system,
and polity 2 score. These variables were either taken directly or derived from publicly available
data provided by the Correlates of War Project57 (which aggregates the data from a number of
peer reviewed papers to promote quantitative political science research), the Polity IV Project
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from the Center of Systemic Peace58 (a nonprofit NGO which tracks the behavior of 167
countries), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development59. Each of the sub
strategy variables was coded based on the historical record.
These measures were chosen based on a care full review of the literature to best capture
the concepts of economic and military strength found in the literature while still being
sufficiently complete to allow for statistically significant results. These are by no means the only
way to quantify these concepts, and other potential measures were considered, such as years
great power, exports, and others. However, many of these potential variables were dropped for
lack of data or after correlational analysis indicated significant overlap with other variables.
Furthermore, it was decided that instead of using the numerical values for the economic and
military power variables, that it would be more appropriate to use a ‘relative’ measure which
took each great power’s raw score for that year and divided it by the sample average of all of the
great powers combined for that year. In addition to creating more meaningful measures for the
concept of relative power, using these variables helps to reduce serial autocorrelation problems
as well as any potential problems arising from differences in the way the underlying military and
economic variables may have been measured over time. Finally, when appropriate, robust
regression techniques were used to address potential problems with heteroscedasticity, auto
correlation and others.
In order to minimize the potential complexity of the system being examined, it was
decided to use data only from great powers and to focus exclusively on their strategy for dealing
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with other great powers. This eliminates potential multi-level issues where the strategies of lesser
states could be limited or affected by the wishes of more powerful ‘patron’ states. Furthermore,
the potential for a major war which could threaten the survival of a great power means that one
would expect the grand strategies chosen by a great power with respect to other such powers to
be as carefully thought out and rational as possible. Finally, great powers have some of the best
developed bureaucracies and thus offer the most complete data available for the longest possible
duration. In this case data from all of the great powers in existence from 1892 to 2012 was used
with the exception of China since its economic and military data is too unreliable to be
incorporated at this time.
This chapter gave a detailed examination of the methods by which this study will go
about examining the relationship between relative economic and military power and grand
strategy choice. Overall, if proponents of realist models of grand strategy are correct then
external variables: such as relative numbers of military personnel, relative military spending,
relative GDP, relative GDP per capita and homeland vulnerability, should have a statistically and
substantively significant effect on grand strategy choice in the three models, after controlling for
other variables. On the other hand, if proponents of constructivist models of grand strategy
choice are correct, then institutional and societal variables like government type, economic
system, nation age and polity2 score will be statistically and substantively significant.
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Chapter 4
Detailed Discussion of Data:
This chapter examines in detail the data which was collected for the study and the way
this data was collected and organized. The first step in the process was data collection and
determining how large a sample of countries would be compared and for what duration. As
stated previously, given the complexity of multi-level models, it was decided to begin by only
looking at Great Powers, states which have the most freedom in developing their own strategies
and which do not have to worry about how their chosen strategy will be modified by the interests
of a more powerful backer state. The next major limitation to the sample was data availability,
this limited both how far back the study could go and which countries could be included. Luckily
there was sufficient data to include all of the major powers (which the exception of modern
China, for which the data was considered too unreliable), as far back as at least 1892, the date
which was chosen to be the beginning of the study. This date corresponds to the U.S. first
achieving the status of a first rank power, as evidenced by European powers upgrading their
diplomatic missions to the status of full ambassadors.60
The next step in the process was the creation of the dependent variables for the three
models. This began by coding the following sub strategy variables: Voluntary war, Binding,
Blackmail / Subversion, Bloodletting, Internal Balancing, External Balancing, Buckpassing /
Retrenchment, Appeasement and Bandwagoning, as well as whether or not a nation’s foreign
policy was Pro or Anti-status quo in nature. These strategies were coded based on the foreign
policy actions of each of the great powers during the period examined and are a modified and
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condensed version of the strategies listed by Trubowitz,61with some strategies combined and
others removed. For example: Trubowitz’s ‘Wars of Conquest’ and ‘Preemptive War’ have been
combined into ‘Voluntary War.’ Just to be clear, according to Trubowitz “Preemptive wars seek
to forestall a shift in the balance of power by strategically attacking before an adversary does, 62”
a relatively broad definition. ‘Imperialism’ was removed because it relates primarily to relations
between greater powers and lesser states, not amongst great powers themselves. Finally,
‘Spheres of Influence’ was dropped because it also relates heavily to the way great powers
interact with lesser powers and because the desire to create spheres of influence was nearly
universal among the great powers for the period examined.
With respect to coding the first dependent variable (Pro or Anti Status quo), for a nation
to be coded as Anti Status quo, it must be attempting to dramatically change its place in the
current world order at the expense of another great power, or make significant efforts to isolate
itself from the current world order. Examples of anti-status quo behavior include not only
Revisionist states like Nazi Germany, but also Isolationist states like North Korea, and even the
United States in its early years. Turning to the ten sub strategy variables: a Voluntary War is one
in which participation by the party in question was voluntary (even if done to help another state)
and are directed either directly at another great power, or at its Allies / material interests /
strategic position. Voluntary wars are not always anti-status quo and range from the Nazi
invasion of Poland, to the United States entering World War 1 on behalf of the allies. Binding is
when countries use negotiation and treaties to lock in relative advantage, this can include both
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economic and security arrangements, and can include anything from setting up 3rd party deals to
protect regional stability to setting up international organizations, as long as the primary
motivation of the country being assessed is to promote its own interests. A classic example of
binding is the creation of NATO which looked to check Russian influence in Europe while
expanding U.S. influence there. Blackmail / Subversion is a catch all for actions short of war,
whether military, political or economic, other than intelligence gathering and bloodletting, which
are directed at another major power (or rising power) or its direct interests. An example of just
how expansive this category can be is that it not only covers Kennedy’s Naval blockade of Cuba,
but also the actions taken by the U.S. in the 1930’s to limit Nazi influence in South America.
Bloodletting is when a power is deliberately trying to sap the military and economic strength of
another power that is engaged with a 3rd party, either through supporting that 3rd party or by
denying timely aid promised to the targeted power. This includes, but is by no means limited to
the involvement of outside powers in proxy wars like Vietnam and Afghanistan. On the other
hand, Intelligence gathering was not tracked as it is effectively a universal aspect of great power
politics.
Continuing with the sub strategy variables, according to Trubowitz, Internal Balancing is
when “a leader is relying on the states own resources to deter a potential aggressor or to defend
against the foreign aggressor should deterrence fail,”63 The most familiar example of this would
be the U.S. entry into World War II following the attack on Pearl Harbor. External Balancing is
when a nation tries “to check a threatening state by pooling resources with other states through
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the formation of alliances.”64 Examples of this include military alliances such as NATO, which
often serve other functions for such as Binding. Buckpassing / Retrenchment is when a power
either refuses to act in the face of a recognized potential threat, abandons its commitments in an
area (leaving a power vacuum to be filled by another power) or reduces its forces in that area to a
level where it can no longer compete for preeminence in the region. An example of this are the
Neutrality Acts passed by the United States Congress in the 1930’s which prevented the United
States from intervening to prevent the rise of Nazi Germany. Trubowitz defines Appeasement as
“efforts by a leader to conciliate or ‘buy off’ a potential aggressor by making unilateral
diplomatic and economic concessions.”65 The classic example of this is Chamberlin trading the
Sudetenland to Hitler in return for Hitler giving up any further territorial ambitions. Finally,
Bandwagoning is when “leaders willingly subordinate their states and themselves to [a] foreign
power” an abbreviated version of the definition used by Trubowitz, since in cases like the post
World War II British relationship with the U.S., it is not necessary that the subordinating power
be subordinating itself to the challenging power.
The next step was to construct the dependent variable for the second model, Probability
of a Major War. This was generated from a time series multivariate logit analysis using a dummy
dependent variable coded 1 for years a country was involved in a major war (and zero
otherwise), with the lagged independent dummy variables for each of the sub strategies serving
as independent variables. This logit regression then was used to predict a probability of major
war breaking out the following year for the combination of sub strategies a country employed
that year. The third dependent variable ‘Grand Strategy’ was then coded using a combination of
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the first two dependent variables. Anti-status quo countries which accepted a non-trivial risk of
major war were coded as revisionist, while anti-status quo countries which employed low risk
policies were coded as isolationist / neutral. Finally, pro status quo high risk nations were coded
as interventionist and pro status quo low risk countries were coded as being legalist.
The final steps in collecting the data was to compile the independent variables for the
three models and to create the relative power variables. The independent variables were either
coded directly based on the historical record or come from one of the following three sources:
Variables on Relative Military Expenditure and Relative Military Personnel, and Relative
Military Expenditure per Personnel were constructed by taking data on military personnel and
military expenditures from the Correlates of War Project and dividing each country by the
sample average for that year.66 The variables on Relative Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and
Relative Per Capita GDP were created by taking OECD data on historical GDP and Per Capita
GDP by Angus Maddison (2006).67 Each of these relative power variables is a scale with a score
of one representing a country having the sample average value, and with values usually ranging
from around 0.05 (or one twentieth of the sample average) to about 3.5 or three and a half times
the sample average for that year. Relative rather than absolute measures were chosen to address
several major potential issues. First, using relative measures of military and economic power
better captures the realist literatures emphasis on a country’s relative military and economic
position as determinants of strategy choice. Second, using a relative measure based on the
sample average for that year, reduces statistical issues associated with potential time based
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inflationary effects in panel models and reduces any potential problems associated with potential
changes in the way the data may have been tracked overtime.68 Next, the Polity 2 Score was
taken from the Polity Project.69 The Polity 2 Score represents the most complete and statistically
friendly measure of how autocratic versus democratic a country’s government is, with a score
ranging from -10 (for a fully institutionalized autocratic state) to 10 (for a fully institutionalized
democratic one). Originally, separate autocratic and democratic variables were going to be used
(as recommended by the Center for Systemic Peace) but there was too much correlation between
them to use both in the model.
Finally, background data such as Nation Age, as well as Homeland Vulnerability,
Government Type, Economic System and Years since Last Major War Ended were coded based
on the historical record. Homeland Vulnerability is the number of other great powers which
share a land border with the country. Government type was coded one for monarchy, two for
presidential democracy, three for parliamentary democracy and four for dictatorships. Economic
System was coded one for Liberal (free trading), two for Marxist and three for Mercantilist.
Government type and Economic system variables were then split into a series of dummy
variables when used in the models as it is a necessary step in order for the statistical models to
properly interpret nominal, rather than ordinal variables. Table 2 (below) gives summary
statistics for the included data.
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This chapter examined the data utilized in the study including: what it represents, from
where and how it was collected, and how it was organized. While this study includes original
data in the form of the coding of the various sub-strategies, one of the things that the analysis of
the data makes clear is that studies such as this one cannot be realistically carried out without the
hard work of many of our fellow researchers and without the cooperation of both governmental
and nongovernmental organizations around the world. Furthermore, the increasing availability of
this data means that we are just beginning to explore ability of quantitative analysis to shed light
on important questions in the field of international relations.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Included Data
Variables:
Country Background Variables:
Year
Nation Age
Sub Strategy Variables:
Anti Status Quo
Voluntary War
Binding
Blackmail / Subversion
Bloodletting
Internal Balancing
External Balancing
Buckpassing / Retrenchment
Appeasement
Bandwagoning
War and Strategy Variables:
Obligatory War
Major War
Probability of Major War****
Years Since Last Major War
Ended
Strategy (Grand Strategy
Chosen)
Independent Variables Used:
R_MilExPer* (Relative
Expenditure per Personnel)
R_milex* (Relative Military
Expenditures)
R_milper* (Relative Military
Personnel)
R_GdpMGK** (Relative GDP)
R_Gdp_PC** (Relative per
capita GDP)
Homeland Vulnerability
Polity2 score***
Government Type
Economic System

Observations:

Mean: Min:

Max:

Std. Deviation:

430
430

1933
106.94

1892
1

2012
242

29.957
75.19

430
430
430
430
430
430
430
430
430
430

0.37
0.12
0.90
0.40
0.08
0.65
0.68
0.10
0.02
0.02

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.48
0.33
0.31
0.49
0.28
0.48
0.47
0.30
0.15
0.14

430
430
421

0.16
0.27
0.02

0
0
0.00

1
1
0.31

0.36
0.45
0.04

430

10.51

0

46

11.67

430

1.91

0

3

0.98

408

1

0.09

4.05

0.72

409

1

0.04

3.46

0.60

408

1

0.05

3.54

0.56

379

1

0.08

3.01

0.67

374

1

0.27

1.57

0.34

430
428
430
430

0.91
3.00
2.34
2.24

0
-10
1
1

4
10
4
3

1.33
7.43
1.08
0.88

*Derived from data from Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington
DC: CQ Press
**Derived from Maddison, Angus (2006) The World Economy: Volume 1: A Millennial Perspective and Volume 2
Historical Statistics. OECD Development Centre
***Taken from Polity Project: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
**** for sub strategies chosen, from xtlogit predict command
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Chapter 5
Data Analysis:
This chapter will give the statistically significant results for each of the three models used
in this study in table form. In addition, it will provide some context for these results by
discussing the statistically significant results of each model in detail in the text accompanying
each model. Given the complexity and interactive nature of Model 3’s results, its implications for
the United States will be discussed in detail in chapter 6, while an overview of its predictions for
the other great powers will be given in chapter 7. With respect to the testing of the hypotheses,
the first and third models will test H1, while the second and third models will test H2.

Model 1:
The first model uses a time series logit analysis to examine relationship between relative
military and economic power and whether a country adopts an anti-status quo strategy the
following year. The results of the logit analysis are given in Table 3 below, and looking at the
model as a whole it is clear from the Wald chi2 of 61.07 and corresponding p-value of 0.00, that
we can reject the null hypotheses of no improvement for the overall model. Looking at each of
the independent variables, we see that Relative Military Expenditures per Personnel, Nation Age,
Homeland Vulnerability, and Parliamentary Democracy are all statistically significant to the 5
percent level or better for the two-tailed test. By comparison, the effects of Relative Military
Personnel, Military Expenditures, Relative Per Capita GDP and Relative GDP were not
statistically significant, nor were Years Since Major War, Dictatorship, Presidential Democracy
or Polity 2 Score. Unfortunately, Economic System could not be included in the model without
causing convergence issues or dropping approximately one third of the observations.
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Table 3: Model 1: Effect of Relative Economic and Military Power as well as Governmental
and Economic Variables on Whether a Nation is Anti Status Quo the Following Year
Odds Ratio

Std. Error

P > |z|

Z Score

Rel. Mil. Expend. per Mil.
Personnel

11.90

11.14

0.008

2.64

Relative Military Personnel

13.43

22.15

0.115

1.57

Relative Military Expenditure

1.79

1.48

0.482

0.70

Relative GDP

1.49

2.21

0.788

0.27

Relative Per Capita GDP

1.97

8.09

0.869

0.16

Nation Age

0.85

0.03

0.000

-4.78

Homeland Vulnerability

0.03

0.03

0.000

-3.79

Polity 2 Score

1.19

0.25

0.425

0.80

Years Since Major War

1.03

0.24

0.160

1.40

Presidential Democracy

0.01

0.28

0.108

-1.61

Parliamentary Democracy

0.001

0.001

0.000

-3.91

Dictatorship

0.02

0.06

0.256

-1.13

Government Type*

Number of Observations

366

Wald chi2

61.07

Prob > chi2

0.0000

Notes:
*Base Government Type was Monarchy
Data derived from:
Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ Press,
Maddison, Angus (2006) The World Economy: Volume 1: A Millennial Perspective and Volume 2
Historical Statistics. OECD Development Centre,
Polity Project: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
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Moving on to a closer examination of the relative power variables, we see that the effect
of Relative Military Expenditures per Personnel is not only statistically significant at the 1%
level for the two-tailed test, but is also substantively significant. Hence we see a one unit
increase in Relative Military Expenditures per Personnel increasing the odds of a country
choosing an Anti-status quo Strategy the following year by a factor of 11.9 holding all other
variables constant. Thus, a great power which spends twice as much per military personnel on
the military than an ‘average’ great power, is almost twelve times more likely to pursue an antistatus quo strategy the following year. This indicates that countries which invest considerably
more per soldier in their militaries than their rivals are more likely to challenge the status quo,
and is in line with realist arguments such as those by Mearsheimer, who argues that states with
greater military power will attempt to use that power to improve their position in the
international system, and Jervis’s theory about offense-defense balance.70 It may also be a result
of the need for states which want to project power to invest heavily in capital intensive aspects of
the military including logistics and mobility, which defensively oriented forces do not require.
The Homeland Vulnerability variable was also statistically significant at better than the
.01 level, with a one unit increase in the number of great powers which share a nations boarder
corresponding to a 97 percent decrease in the odds of a nation adopting an anti-status quo
strategy the following year. This indicates that states which are more vulnerable to direct attack
from rivals are much more likely to buy into the international system and are less likely to
directly challenge the status quo than states which are operating from a secure homeland, with

70

Mearsheimer, John J. (2003). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. NewYork: W.W. Norton and Company. Kindle
Edition location 253.
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perhaps the ultimate example of a vulnerable, pro status quo state, being the Austrian Hungarian
Empire.
Turning now to the structural indicators, Nation Age and Parliamentary Democracy, were
both statistically significant at the .01 level, or better, for the two-tailed test. Looking at Nation
Age, a one year increase in a country’s age corresponds to a 15% reduction in the odds of
choosing an anti-status quo strategy the following year. This means that as nations age they are
increasingly likely to choose to pursue pro status quo strategies. Although this tendency may be a
result of pro status quo states surviving longer, it also provides support for Organski and
Kugler’s conclusions in The War Ledger.71 For example, if a great power maintains its status for
twenty years, its odds of choosing a pro status quo strategy increase by a factor of three. Finally,
Parliamentary Democracies are 99.9 percent more likely to choose a pro status quo policy the
following year than Monarchies, with all other factors being equal; indicating a strong pro status
quo preference on the part of Parliamentary Democracies, providing some support for
democratic peace theory. Looking at Model 1 overall, it is apparent that a mix of relative and
structural variables affect whether a state follows a pro or anti status quo strategy, although the
variables tested represent only a partial sample of those which may have a statistically significant
effect.

71

Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kindle Edition Loc.
3082
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Model 2:
The second model uses a time series ordinary least squares regression analysis with panel
corrected standard errors to examine the relationship between relative military and economic
power and the risk of war a country assumes the following year (here measured by the
probability of major war based on the sub strategies chosen that year). The results of the OLS
analysis are given in Table 4 below, and looking at the model as a whole, it is clear from the
Wald chi2 of 107.00 and R-squared of 0.39, that we can reject the null of no improvement for the
overall model.
Looking at each of the independent variables, we see that Relative Military Expenditures
per Personnel, Relative Military Expenditure, Homeland Vulnerability, Years Since Major War,
Presidential Democracy and Dictatorship were all statistically significant to the 5 percent level
for the two-tailed test, while Relative Per Capita GDP was significant at the 10% level. Among
the relative power variables, only the effects of Relative Military Personnel and Relative GDP
were not statistically significant, while several of the structural variables, including Nation Age,
Economic System, Parliamentary Democracy and Polity 2 Score were not statistically
significant.
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Table 4: Model 2; Effect of Relative Economic and Military Power as well as Governmental
and Economic Variables on Risk of Major War the Following Year

Rel. Expend. Per Personnel

Coefficient
0.014

Panel Corrected
Std. Error
0.005

P > |z|
0.006

Z Score
2.78

Relative Military Personnel

-0.007

0.010

0.463

-0.73

Relative Military Expenditure

-0.018

0.006

0.006

-2.76

Relative GDP

0.003

0.005

0.525

0.64

Relative Per Capita GDP

0.038

0.021

0.076

1.77

Nation Age

0.0001

0.00008

0.206

1.26

Homeland Vulnerability

0.036

0.006

0.000

6.09

Years Since Major War

-0.003

.00003

0.000

-8.48

Polity 2 Score

0.0005

0.001

0.705

0.38

Marxist

-0.004

0.027

0.889

-0.14

Mercantilist

-0.001

0.010

0.931

-0.09

Presidential Democracy

-0.033

0.012

0.004

-2.85

Parliamentary Democracy

-0.013

0.013

0.319

-1.00

Dictatorship

0.056

0.019

0.003

2.95

Economic System**

Government Type*

Number of Observations

366

R-squared

0.39

Wald chi2

107.00

Prob > chi2

0.00

Notes:
*Base Government Type was Monarchy, **Base Economic System was Liberal
Data derived from:
Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ Press,
Maddison, Angus (2006) The World Economy: Volume 1: A Millennial Perspective and Volume 2
Historical Statistics. OECD Development Centre,
Polity Project: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html

44

Turning to a closer examination of the relative power variables, Relative Military
Expenditures Per Personnel was not only statistically significant at the one percent level, but was
also substantively significant, with a one unit increase in Relative Military Personnel increasing
the probability of major war the following year by 1.4 percentage points holding all other
variables constant. Given that a state which spends the sample average per military personnel has
about a 2% chance of being involved in a major war (all else being held constant), a great power
which spends 4 times the sample average per personnel (within the maximum observed) more
than triples their odds of being involved in a major war the following year. Also, it is important
to keep in mind that while the risk of war in any given year is generally very small
(approximately 2%), these wars are cataclysmic events making countries sensitive to even small
fluctuations in the odds. To put it another way, a country which spends the average per soldier
for a great power that year, holding all else constant, will likely be involved in a major war every
50 years. However, a great power which spends near the sample maximum per soldier will,
holding all else constant, likely be involved in a major conflict every 16.1 years. This would
seem to be clear evidence in favor of a link between military power and risk taking, along the
lines of Mearsheimer’s ‘offensive realism,’ but the evidence is more complex.72
Moving on to Relative Military Expenditures, which was also significant at the one
percent level, we see the exact opposite relationship to that of Relative Expenditures per
Personnel, with a one unit increase in relative military expenditures decreasing the odds of being
involved in a major conflict the following year by 1.8 percentage points. This result is surprising
and when taken along with the effect of Relative Military Expenditures Per Personnel, is another

72

Mearsheimer, John J. (2003). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. NewYork: W.W. Norton and Company. Kindle
Edition location 177.
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indication that the configuration of a nation’s military may have a greater effect on a country’s
choice of strategies than either its size or cost alone. This provides some statistical evidence for
the effect of some form of the offense – defense balance and resulting security dilemma
proposed by Robert Jervis.73 It is also important to note that in those cases where both Relative
Military Expenditures and Relative Military Expenditures per Personnel increase, the effect of
Relative Military Expenditures is likely to dominate the effect of increased Expenditures Per
Personnel since Relative Military Expenditures has a larger effect per unit change (coefficient),
potentially contradicting not only the conclusions of Mearshimer74, but also to some extent
Organski and Kugler.75
Another statistically significant relative power variable and the only statistically
significant economic variable (although only at the 10% level), was Relative Per Capita GDP. A
one unit increase in Relative Per Capita GDP corresponds to a 3.8 percentage point increase in
the risk of war the following year. This is more than twice the effect of the relative military
power variables per unit change, but is constrained by the fact that there is far less extreme
variation in Relative per Capita GDP, with a minimum value of 0.27 and maximum value of
1.57, a range of about 1.3 units. Compare this to the range of other relative power variables such
as Relative Military Expenditures, which has a minimum of .04 and a maximum of 3.56, a
variance of over three and a half units. Thus overall, the substantive impact of Relative per
Capita GDP may be less than that of Relative Military Expenditures. Furthermore, the fact that

73

Jervis, Robert. (1978). “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics, Vol.30, No.2 (January 1978).
pp. 186-214
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Mearsheimer, John J. (2003). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. NewYork: W.W. Norton and Company. Kindle
Edition location 177.
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Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kindle Edition Loc.
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countries with higher levels of GDP seem to be willing to shoulder greater risks than countries
with lower levels of per capita GDP indicates that we may need to re-evaluate the aphorism that
the most dangerous countries are those with nothing to lose. Instead it seems to be those
countries whose citizens have higher per capita incomes than their rivals that seem to be most
aggressive, although whether this is a result of feeling compelled to defend the status quo or to
challenge it is one of the things which should become clearer when we look at model 3. This is in
line with Mearsheimer’s76arguments in favor of “offensive realism” since great powers with the
most available resources seem to be the most combative, as well as with Organski and Kugler77
argument that wars are most likely to occur when a challenger has equaled or exceeded the
military and economic power of the current hegemon. Taken together, the military and economic
results show a direct link between economic power and the adoption of high risk strategies, but a
much more complex relationship between military power and risk taking.
Turning to the last statistically significant structural variable, Homeland Vulnerability,
we see that a one unit increase in the number of other powers which a state boarders increases
the probability of a major war occurring the following year by 3.6 percentage points. Thus, a
country like Imperial Russia which bordered 4 other powers would increase its risk of being
involved in a major war by 10.8 percentage points, or a factor of six. This argues that great
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Mearsheimer, John J. (2003). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. NewYork: W.W. Norton and Company. Kindle
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powers which directly border other powers may be more tightly locked into a zero sum game
with their neighbors where security is concerned and thus more open to taking risks.78
Moving on to the statistically significant structural variables, beginning with Years Since
Major War, which was statistically significant at the one percent level for the two tailed test, we
see that each year after the end of a major war decreases the odds of being involved in another
major war the next year by 0.3 percentage points. This means that the longer it has been since a
country has been involved in a major conflict, the less likely they are to be involved in a major
conflict the next year. The converse of this is that countries which have recently been involved in
major conflicts are the ones most vulnerable to being involved in the future, creating a selfperpetuating cycle. Moving on to Presidential Democracy which was also significant at the one
percent level, we see that presidential democracies are 3.3 percentage points less likely to be
involved in a major war the following year than Monarchies, holding all other variables constant.
This provides some statistical evidence for democratic peace theory. By comparison, we see that
Dictatorships (which were also significant at the one percent level) have the opposite effect, with
Dictatorships being 5.6 percentage points more likely to be involved in a major conflict the
following year than Monarchies. This is the largest coefficient of any of the statistically
significant variables and provides strong evidence for arguments that, among great powers at
least, Dictatorships are more likely to take actions which risk starting major wars.
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For a historical example see: Lynn II, John A. 2011 “The Grand Strategy of the Grand Siècle: Learning from the
wars of Louis XIV.” The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy and War. Eds. Williamson Murry, Richard Hart
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Model 3:
The third model uses a multinomial logit analysis with robust standard errors to examine
the relationship between relative military and economic power and a nation’s choice of grand
strategy the following year. The statistically significant results of the multinomial logit analysis
are given in Tables 5a1-5a4 below, with the full results of the analysis (organized by independent
variable type) are presented in tables 5b1-5b4 in the appendix. Looking at the model as a whole
it is clear from the pseudo R-squared of 0.68, that we can reject the null of no improvement for
the overall model.
Beginning with the statistically significant relative military power variables (Table 5a1
below), we can see that Relative Military Expenditures per Military Personnel, Relative Military
Personnel and Relative Military Expenditures, all had statistically significant effects on grand
strategy choice the following year. Looking at the effects of Relative Expenditures per
Personnel, we can see that, holding all other variables constant, a one-unit increase in Relative
Expenditures per Personnel increases the odds of a country choosing an Interventionist rather
than a Legalist strategy the following year by a factor of 7.2. While, holding all other variables
constant, a one-unit increase in Relative Expenditures per Personnel increases the odds of
choosing a Revisionist vs. Legalist Grand Strategy by a factor of 32.5. Both of these results were
significant at the 1% level or better for the two tailed test. Taken together these results indicate
that the as Relative Expenditures per Military Personnel increases, countries are more likely to
choose higher risk strategies such as Interventionism or Revisionism, at least compared to a
Legalist approach, which is in line with the results of model 2.

49

Table 5a1: Model 3; Statistically Significant Effects of Relative Military Power
Variables on Grand Strategy Choice the Following Year
Coefficient

Z Score

P > |z|

% Change

Legalist vs. Interventionist

-1.97

-2.095

0.036

-86.1

Legalist vs. Revisionist

-3.48

-3.697

0.000

-96.9

Interventionist vs. Legalist

1.97

2.095

0.036

619.1

Revisionist vs. Legalist

3.48

3.696

0.000

3149.9

Legalist vs. Isolationist

-8.77

-3.111

0.002

-100.0

Legalist vs. Interventionist

-3.80

-2.433

0.015

-97.8

Legalist vs. Revisionist

-4.92

-3.145

0.002

-99.3

Isolationist vs. Legalist

8.77

3.111

0.002

643467.1

Interventionist vs. Legalist

3.80

2.433

0.015

4369.4

Revisionist vs. Legalist

4.92

3.061

0.002

13488.7

Legalist vs. Interventionist

2.62

2.541

0.011

1274.4

Legalist vs. Revisionist

1.75

1.695

0.090

474.5

Interventionist vs. Legalist

-2.62

-2.541

0.011

-92.7

Revisionist vs. Legalist

-1.75

-1.839

0.066

-82.6

Number of Observations

366

Rel. Expend. Per Personnel

Relative Military Personnel

Relative Military Expenditure

Pseudo R-squared

0.6789

Pseudo Log Likelihood

-145.63

Notes:
Underline
Data derived from:

= more likely strategy choice
Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to
War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ Press,
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For Relative Military Personnel, holding all other variables constant, a one-unit increase
in Relative Military Personnel increases the odds of a country choosing an Isolationist instead of
Legalist Grand Strategy the following year by a factor of 6,436. In addition, a one-unit increase
in Relative Military Personnel increases the odds of a country choosing an Interventionist, as
opposed to Legalist, Grand Strategy by a factor of 44.7. Finally, a one-unit increase in Relative
Military Personnel also increases the odds of a country choosing a Revisionist vs. Legalist Grand
Strategy by a factor of 136. All of these effects were significant at the .05 level or better for the
two-tailed test. Here the power of a multinomial logit analysis versus the previous models comes
to the forefront, because it can show that a one unit increase in Relative Military Personnel
reduces the odds of a country choosing a legalist strategy by at least 97% compared to any other
strategy. In contrast to the previous models, which when taken together, only predict that a one
unit increase in Relative Military Personnel should correspond to an increase likelihood of
choosing an isolationist grand strategy, which is accurate, but gives an incomplete picture of the
variable’s effects.
Moving on to Relative Military Expenditures, a one unit increase in Relative Military
Expenditures increases the odds of a country choosing a Legalist as opposed to Interventionist
Grand Strategy the following year by a 1,274%, holding all other variables constant. However, a
one unit increase in Relative Military Expenditures increases the odds of a country choosing a
Legalist vs. Revisionist Grand Strategy by 475%. Both were statistically significant at the 10%
level or better. Overall, increasing Relative Military Expenditures has the opposite effect of
increasing Expenditures per Personnel, which creates an interesting dynamic and one which
plays out in the second model as well. Another important point to keep in mind is that the only
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statistically significant effects of the military power variables relate to the odds of a nation
choosing whether to adopt a Legalist Grand Strategy. Thus, as Military Expenditures Per
Personnel and Relative Military Personnel increase, the odds of a country adopting a Legalist
Grand Strategy decrease; while as Relative Military Expenditures increases, the odds of choosing
a Legalist Grand Strategy increases, indicating that the way a great power structures its military
forces may have a bigger impact on strategy choice than its raw power alone.
Looking at the three Relative Military Power Variables combined (see Table 5a2 below),
we see that they primarily affect the odds of a state adopting a legalist strategy, with increases in
Expenditures per Personnel and Relative Military Personnel overall both corresponding to
decreased odds of choosing a Legalist Grand Strategy. Only Relative Military Expenditures was
positively correlated with a Legalist Grand Strategy. The interconnected nature of the Relative
Military Power variables makes their analysis more complicated since a significant increase in
one variable will correspond to a decrease in another variable unless a third variable is changed
as well. For example, a one unit increase in Relative Military Personnel will decrease Relative
Expenditures per Personnel (but not necessarily by one unit), with each of these changes having
the opposite effect on the odds of a country adopting a Legalist Grand Strategy, unless Relative
Military Expenditures are also increased. If Relative Military Expenditures was also increased,
then Relative Expenditures Per Personnel would remain relatively static, but the increase in
Relative Military Expenditures also has the opposite effect on the odds of country choosing a
Legalist Grand Strategy than the increase in Relative Military Personnel. This is further
complicated by the scale of the effects of each of the Relative Military Power Variables. For
example, in the above scenarios, the effect of a one unit increase in Relative Military Personnel
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will drown out a similar increase in either of the other variables since its effects are several times
larger per unit increase.
Examining relative economic power variables (Relative GDP and Relative per Capita
GDP in Table 5a2 below), we can see that the economic effects have the most impact on whether
a nation choses to adopt a Revisionist Grand Strategy. For example, holding all other factors
constant, a one unit increase in Relative GDP decreases the likelihood a country will choose a
Legalist, as opposed to Revisionist, strategy by 98.6%. At the same time, a one unit increase in
Relative Per capita GDP increases the odds a nation will choose a Revisionist vs. Isolationist
strategy by 35,314%. Both of these results were significant at the .05 level or better. Taken
together these results indicate that as a great power’s finances improve they are more likely to
choose a Revisionist Grand Strategy. This result provides some evidence that a countries ability
to finance a potential conflict may be a limiting factor in choosing risky or aggressive grand
strategies, in both absolute terms and in terms of its effects on internal coalitions, and is in line
with the arguments of Trubowitz and others.79 This finding is consistent with, but more narrow
than, that of model one which found that as Per Capita GDP increases, countries are increasingly
likely to adopt anti-status quo strategies the following year.
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Table 5a2: Model 3; Statistically Significant Effects of Economic Variables on
Grand Strategy Choice the Following Year
Coefficient

Z Score

P > |z|

% Change

-4.25

-4.801

0.000

-98.6

5.87

2.097

0.036

35313.8

Legalist vs. Revisionist

9.23

2.389

0.017

1.0x10^6

Revisionist vs. Legalist

-9.21

-1.799

0.072

-100.0

1.62

1.890

0.059

404.8

Legalist vs. Revisionist

-10.78

-12.579

0.000

-100.0

Interventionist vs. Legalist

-1.62

-1.890

0.059

-80.2

Number of Observations

366

Relative GDP
Legalist vs. Revisionist
Relative GDP Per Capita
Revisionist vs. Isolationist
Primarily Marxist Economy

Primarily Mercantilist Economy
Legalist vs. Interventionist

Pseudo R-squared

0.6789

Pseudo Log Likelihood

-145.63

Notes:
**Base Economic System was Liberal
Underline = more likely strategy choice
Data derived from:
Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ Press,
Maddison, Angus (2006) The World Economy: Volume 1: A Millennial Perspective and Volume 2
Historical Statistics. OECD Development Centre,

Looking at the economic system variables, we can see that holding all other factors
constant, a Primarily Marxist Economy is 10,000 times more likely to be Legalist than
Revisionist, compared to Primarily Liberal Economies. However, Primarily Mercantilist
Economies, while 405% more likely to be Legalist than Interventionist, are approximately 100%
less likely to be Legalist than Revisionist compared to primarily Liberal Economies, holding all
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other factors constant. These effects were statistically significant at the 10% level or better for
the two tailed test. This means that nations with a primarily Mercantilist Economy are more
likely to choose a Legalist rather than Interventionist Strategy, and are even more likely to
choose a Revisionist rather than Legalist Grand Strategy.
Moving on to political variables (given in Table 5a3 below), compared to Monarchies,
Presidential Democracies are 270,000 times more likely to adopt a Legalist, as opposed to
Revisionist, Grand Strategy, holding all other factors constant. More importantly, when
compared to Monarchies, Presidential Democracies are far more likely to adopt an Isolationist
Grand Strategy, for example they are 5.6 x 10^19 times more likely to choose an Isolationist as
opposed to Legalist strategy, are 7.5 x 10^18 times more likely to choose an Isolationist rather
than Interventionist strategy and 1.5 x 10^25 times more likely to choose an Isolationist rather
than Revisionist Grand Strategy, holding all other factors constant. Taken together, this means
that Presidential Democracies are far more likely to choose a low risk strategy and an Isolationist
Strategy in particular, than are Monarchies. This tracks with the results of model 2 which
indicated that Presidential Democracies are more likely to choose low risk strategies compared to
Monarchies.
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Table 5a3: Model 3; Statistically Significant Effects of Political Variables on
Grand Strategy Choice the Following Year
Coefficient

Z Score

P > |z|

% Change

Legalist vs. Isolationist

-45.47

-3.808

0.000

-100

Legalist vs. Revisionist

12.49

4.327

0.000

2.7x10^7

Isolationist vs. Legalist

45.47

3.808

0.000

5.6x10^21

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

43.46

3.381

0.001

7.5x10^20

Isolationist vs Revisionist

57.96

4.509

0.000

1.5x10^27

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

-43.46

-3.381

0.001

-100.0

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

-57.96

-5.838

0.000

-100.0

Legalist vs. Interventionist

-5.31

-4.408

0.000

-99.5

Interventionist vs. Legalist

5.31

4.408

0.000

20139.7

Legalist vs. Revisionist

-10.68

-7.004

0.000

-100.0

Revisionist vs. Legalist

10.68

2.576

0.010

4.4x10^6

Revisionist vs. Interventionist

9.01

2.182

0.029

819109.0

Legalist vs. Revisionist

0.32

2.359

0.018

38.3

Number of Observations

366

Presidential Democracy

Parliamentary Democracy

Dictatorship

Polity 2 Score

Pseudo R-squared

0.6789

Pseudo Log Likelihood

-145.63

Notes:
*Base Government Type was Monarchy,
Underline = more likely strategy choice
Data derived from:
Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ
Press,
Polity Project: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
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Looking at other government forms, when compared to Monarchies, the odds of
Parliamentary Democracies being Interventionist, as opposed to Legalist, increase by a factor of
202. On the other hand, for Dictatorships, the odds of being Revisionist rather than Legalist are
increased by a factor of 44,000, and the odds of being Revisionist versus Interventionist are
higher by a factor of 8,192, holding all other factors constant. These results are in line with those
of model 2 which indicated that when compared to Monarchies, Dictatorships tended to assume a
much higher Risk of Major War the following year. The last political variable, Polity 2 Score is a
little different, with a one unit increase in Polity 2 Score increasing the odds of a country being
Legalist as opposed to Revisionist by 38.3%, holding all other factors constant. Finally, these
results were statistically significant at the .05 level or better.
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Table 5a4: Model 3; Statistically Significant Effects of Other Variables on Grand
Strategy Choice the Following Year
Coefficient

Z Score

P > |z|

% Change

Legalist vs. Isolationist

10.57

2.779

0.005

3.9x10^6

Legalist vs. Revisionist

3.52

3.639

0.000

3281.3

Isolationist vs. Legalist

-10.57

-2.779

0.005

-100.0

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

-10.47

-3.224

0.001

-100.0

Isolationist vs Revisionist

-7.05

-2.171

0.030

-99.9

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

10.47

3.224

0.001

3.5x10^6

Revisionist vs. Legalist

-3.52

-3.703

0.000

-97.0

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

7.05

2.183

0.029

115436.3

Revisionist vs. Interventionist

-3.42

-5.938

0.000

-96.7

Legalist vs. Isolationist

0.2162

1.952

0.051

24.1

Legalist vs. Revisionist

0.09

7.634

0.000

9.3

Isolationist vs. Legalist

-0.22

-1.95

0.051

-19.4

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

-0.22

-2.073

0.038

-19.9

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

0.22

2.073

0.038

24.8

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

0.13

1.956

0.050

13.6

Number of Observations

366

Homeland Vulnerability

Nation Age

Pseudo R-squared

0.6789

Pseudo Log Likelihood

-145.63

Notes:
*Base Government Type was Monarchy, **Base Economic System was Liberal
Underline = more likely strategy choice
Data derived from:
Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ
Press,
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Moving on to the last two variables (in Table 5a4 above), starting with Homeland
Vulnerability, we see that it had several effects which were statistically significant at the .05
level or better for the two-tailed test. First, holding all other factors constant, a one-unit increase
in Homeland Vulnerability reduces the odds of a state choosing an Isolationist strategy by at
least 99.9% versus the other three grand strategy choices. For example, a one-unit increase in
Homeland Vulnerability increases the odds of a nation choosing a Legalist, as opposed to
Isolationist Grand Strategy by a factor of 39,000; an Interventionist versus Isolationist strategy
by a factor of 35,000, and the odds of a Revisionist vs. an Isolationist Grand Strategy by a factor
of 1,155, holding all other variables constant. Secondly, looking at the effects of increased
Homeland Vulnerability on whether a country chooses to adopt a Revisionist Grand Strategy, we
see that a one-unit increase reduces the odds a country will adopt a Revisionist vs. Legalist
Grand Strategy by 97% and reduces the odds of a Revisionist as opposed to Interventionist
Grand Strategy by 96.7%. Taken all together, this means that as Homeland Vulnerability
increases nations are more likely to choose Revisionist over Isolationist Strategies, but they are
even more likely to adopt pro status quo strategies than either an Isolationist or a Revisionist
Policy. This is very much in line with the results of the first two models, which indicated that as
Homeland Vulnerability increases countries are more likely to adopt Pro Status-Quo Strategies
and are willing to accept a higher Risk of Major War the following year.
Finally, looking at Nation Age, a one-unit increase corresponds to a 24.1% increase in the
odds of being Legalist as opposed to Isolationist and a 9.3% increase in the odds of being
Legalist as opposed to Revisionist, holding all other variables constant. Furthermore, a one unit
increase in Nation Age increases the odds of a nation adopting an Interventionist strategy rather
than Isolationist strategy by 24.8% and Revisionist instead of Isolationist by 13.6%. This means
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that as great powers age they tend to be increasingly pro status quo generally and are especially
less likely to become isolationist and withdraw from playing any role in the international system.
These results are in line with both previous models. Furthermore, all of the above results were
significant at the 5% level or better for the two-tailed test.
To get a better idea of how well the multinomial model can predict a great power’s
choice of grand strategy, Figure 1 (below) compares the Model’s Predicted Grand Strategy
Choice with the Observed Grand Strategy Choice Variable (the Dependent Variable Model 3
was attempting to predict). As we can see from the Figure 1 and the accompanying table (see
below), the model successfully predicted a nations choice of grand strategy in some 310 out of
356 observed cases, or about 87% of the time.
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Figure 1: Twoway Jittered Scatter of Predicted
vs. Observed Strategies.

Observed Grand Strategies
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Predicted Grand Strategy:
Observed:

Legalist

Isolationist

Interventionist

Revisionist

Total:

Legalist

39

0

11

6

56

Isolationist

1

28

0

3

32

Interventionist

12

0

146

2

160

Revisionist

1

5

5

97

108

Total:

53

33

162

108

356

In conclusion, while the models used in this study represent only an initial quantitative
examination of the relationship between relative military and economic power and grand strategy
choice, and are limited only to modern great powers, there is substantial agreement between the
statistically significant effects of the three models, with the third model providing the most
nuanced view of the relationship between the independent variables tested and Grand Strategy
Choice. In the future, the goal would be to improve and expand these models not only to cover a
wider array of potential explanations and greater sample size, but also to cover regional and
lesser powers with their more complex interactions and issues.
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Chapter 6
Detailed Analysis of Model 3 Predictions for The United States: 1892-1992
This chapter will attempt to clarify how the complex interactions of Model 3 work
together in a real world historical example. Figure 2 (below), shows the Model 3 predictions
based on the prior year’s data for the United States for the years covered by the dataset. The
United States was chosen for more in-depth analysis because it has the most complete data
available (it has data for every variable for all 100 years the data set covers) and because it is the
most difficult country for the model to successfully predict (Model 3 only successfully predicts
the observed grand strategy for the U.S. about 78% of the time, compared to an average of 87%).

As we can see from Figure 1 above, prior to 1902 the model broadly predicts that the
U.S. will adopt an Isolationist Grand Strategy. On the other hand, after 1902 the model predicts
the U.S. will adopt either an Interventionist or a Legalist Grand Strategy, depending largely on
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changes in the relative power variables (as the structural variables change little during this
period, apart from time variables such as nation age). However, while the Model 3 predictions
are broadly consistent with the way U.S. foreign policy has been described during this period,80 a
great deal more of the strengths and weaknesses of the model can be seen by looking at its
predictions in more detail and comparing these predictions with a timeline of major U.S. foreign
policy events.
The Figures below (3A-3D) give the Model 3 predictions for U.S. Grand Strategy Choice
from the Year 1892 to 1992 superimposed over a timeline of 110 important U.S. foreign policy
actions and events. Each of the sub figures covers a twenty-five-year period and the numbers on
each figure are colored to represent the strategy choice with which they are most consistent, with
bold numbers indicating a major war, and black numbers indicating either that there are multiple
consistent strategies or that the event does not directly relate to another great power (and thus
would not be included in the current model as it only predicts strategies relating to other great
powers). Below each figure is a numbered list of the included foreign policy events and the year
they occurred.

80

See: Herring, George C. 2008. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. New York: Oxford
University Press.; Kennedy, Paul. 1991. Grand Strategies in War and Peace. New Haven: Yale. pp.171-172.; La
Faber, Walter. 2012. “The U.S. Rise to World Power, 1776-1945. ” and Saul, Richard. 2012. “American Policy During
the Cold War.” In US Foreign Policy, ed. Michael Cox and Doug Stokes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Major U.S. Foreign Policy Actions:81
1. Lifting of Brazilian Blockade (1894)
2. Dispute over British Guiana (1894)
3. Spanish American War (1898)
4. Open Door Note I (1899)
5. Boxer Rebellion (1900)
6. Open Door Note II (1900)
7. Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine
(1904)

8. Treaty of Portsmouth (1905)
9. Great White Fleet (1907)
10. Dollar Diplomacy (1907-1913)
11. Occupation of Veracruz (1914)
12. Punitive Expedition to Mexico (1916-1917)
13. National Defense Act of June 1916
14. U.S. Participation in World War 1 (19171918)

As we can see from Figure 3-A (above), Model 3 predicts that the U.S. will pursue an
Isolationist grand strategy prior to 1901, and then a shift to a more pro status quo grand strategy
(either Interventionist or Legalist) thereafter. While for the most part historical events are
consistent with the models predictions, one area which appears to be an exception is the group of
revisionist events leading up to the Spanish American War. However, it is important to note that

81

Events taken from: Herring, George C. 2008. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. New
York: Oxford University Press.
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these actions, the Lifting of the Brazilian Blockade (1894), the Dispute over British Guiana
(1894) and the Spanish American War (1898) all involve actions attempting to limit or remove
the influence of other great powers within the Western Hemisphere, an area that has been an
exception to the traditionally isolationist grand strategy of the United States going back to the
creation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823.82
Therefore, the revisionist actions taken by the United States in South and Central
America in the late 1800’s do not necessarily indicate that the U.S. is taking a revisionist
approach to foreign policy generally, especially with respect to the other great powers in areas
outside of the western hemisphere. Furthermore, the lack of any significant foreign policy events
outside of the western hemisphere during this period is consistent with an overall Isolationist
Grand Strategy as predicted by the model. Thus, the Monroe doctrine is perhaps best
characterized as a sub strategy rather than the type of overall grand strategy that Model 3 is
attempting to predict. Looking at the rest of this period, the model does a good job of predicting
the shift to a more active, and pro status quo, foreign policy envisioned by American
progressives beginning with President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration following President
McKinley’s assassination in 1901.83 84

82

La Faber, Walter. 2012. “The U.S. Rise to World Power, 1776-1945. ” In US Foreign Policy, ed. Michael Cox and
Doug Stokes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pg.46
83

Ibid. pp. 49.

84

Zelizer, Julian E.2009. Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security from World War II to the War on
Terrorism. New York: Basic Books. Pg. 19
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Major U.S. Foreign Policy Actions:85
15. Allied Intervention in Russia (1918-1919)
16. Washington Naval Conference (1921-1922)
17. Dawes Plan (1924)
18. Locarno Conference (1925)
19. Kellog-Briand Pact Outlawing War (1928)
20. Young Plan / BIS (1929)
21. Great Depression Begins (1929)
22. London Naval Conference (1930)
23. Stimson Doctrine (1932)
24. Roosevelt’s Rejection of London
Conference Agreement (1933)
25. Recognition of the USSR (1933)
26. Montevideo Conference (1933)
27. 1935 Neutrality Act
28. 1936 Neutrality Act

29. 1937 Neutrality Act (added Cash and Carry)
30. 1939 Neutrality Act (Repeals Embargo on
Arms Sales, Extends Cash and Carry)
31. 1940 Defense Appropriations
32. Destroyers for Bases (1940)
33. Lend-Lease (1940)
34. The Act of Havana (1940)
35. Good Neighbor Policy Expansion (1940)
36. Limited Embargo on Japan (1940)
37. Atlantic Charter (1941)
38. Greer Incident, Convoy Protection and
Repeal of the Neutrality Acts (1941)
39. Full Embargo of Japan (1941)
40. Attack on Pearl Harbor (U.S. in W.W. II
1941-1945)

85

Events taken from: Herring, George C. 2008. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. New
York: Oxford University Press.
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Figure 3-B (Above) covers the period from 1917-1942. Overall, throughout the interwar
period the model predicts that the U.S. will assume a Legalist Grand Strategy, and this prediction
is consistent with most of the observed foreign policy actions and events during this period.
However, there are two notable exceptions, the first is the group of Isolationist foreign policy
actions spanning from 1933 to 1937, and the other is large cluster of Interventionist foreign
policy actions beginning in 1940. The Isolationist events began with President Franklin
Roosevelt rejecting the London Conference Agreement of 1933 and continued with the 19351937 Neutrality acts, before coming to an end with the passage of the 1939 Neutrality Act.
This period is interesting because, while the model predicts that the United States would
adopt a more pro status quo foreign policy, it adopted an isolationist strategy instead. This
adoption of an Isolationist Grand Strategy would cause the United States to avoid taking a
leading role during this volatile period, something that the U.S. has been heavily criticized for,
and a failure which may have help to contribute to the outbreak of World War II. 86 This failure
may also explain the later cluster of unpredicted Interventionist actions in 1940 and 1941 as the
United States attempts to reverse its Isolationist course at the last minute and prepare for the
possibility of intervening in World War II. This interventionist shift defies the Model’s
expectations primarily because the U.S. had been left behind militarily by the other great powers,
which made embarking on an Interventionist Policy far less likely. For example, in 1932,
military expenditures in the United States amounted to 81% of the mean for military

86

See: Kennedy, Paul. 1989. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Changes and Military Conflict from
1500 to 2000. New York: Vintage Books. Kindle Edition. Loc.7160 - 7261
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expenditures for great powers for that year, while by 1940 the United States spent only 21% of
the mean for great powers for that year.87
Figure 3-C (Below) covers the twenty-five-year period from 1942 to 1967, and overall
the Model 3 predictions follow very closely with the observed foreign policy actions for this
period, with the clear majority of policy actions following the most likely predicted Grand
Strategy Choice. The primary exceptions to this are the U.S. response to the Soviet-Turkish
Crisis of 1946, and a series of Legalist actions taken in the middle east in the 1950’s and 60’s.
The Turkish Crisis of 1946 represents the end of post war cooperation between the
U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and the beginning of the Cold War, while the legalist events in the
1950’s and 60’s represent efforts by the U.S. to either strengthen or mediate between
governments in South America and the Middle East in an effort to avoid conflict and promote
those states ability to resist communist influence without requiring direct U.S. military
intervention.88 Thus, while these events are primarily legalist in nature, they in no way conflict
with an Interventionist Grand Strategy overall and instead represent another example of the U.S.
employing a sub strategy different from the overall grand strategy the U.S. pursues. Statistically,
this period represents the time frame in which the model was best able to predict U.S. Foreign
policy actions, and this is not surprising as the model is primarily realist in nature and this period
is the one in which U.S. politics most closely resembles the realist ideal.89

87

Data Derived from: Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007.

Washington DC: CQ Press
88

Herring, George C. 2008. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. New York: Oxford
University Press. pp. 670-678.
89

Zelizer, Julian E.2009. Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security from World War II to the War on
Terrorism. New York: Basic Books. Pg. 67-203
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Major U.S. Foreign Policy Actions:90
41. Bretton Woods / World Bank / IMF (1944)
42. Yalta Conference (1945)
43. UN Charter Approved (1945)
44. Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting in
Moscow (1945)
45. Soviet-Turkish Crisis (1946)
46. National Security Act of July 1947 (creates
CIA)
47. Truman Doctrine / Military Aid to Greece and
Turkey (1947)
48. Operation Rollback (1947)
49. The Rio Pact (1947)
50. The Marshall Plan (1948)
51. CIA intervention in Italian Elections (1948)
52. The Berlin Airlift (1948-1949)
53. The Treaty of Washington (Creates NATO,
1949)
54. Mutual Defense Assistance Act (1949)
55. Korean War (1950-1953)
56. Implementation of NSC 68 (1950)
57. Four Point Program (1950)
58. ‘Campaign for Truth’ begins (1950)

59. U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (1951)
60. New Look / NSC-162/2 (1953)
61. U.S.-South Korea Defense Treaty (1953)
62. Project Ajax (US/British led Iranian Coup,
1953)
63. South East Asia Treaty Organization (1954)
64. Nine Powers Conference (1954)
65. Baghdad Pact (1954)
66. Taiwan Straights Crisis / Formosa Resolution
(1954-1955)
67. U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty (1955)
68. Suez Crisis (1956)
69. Eisenhower Doctrine in Mideast with
interventions in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria
(1956-1958)
70. Bay of Pigs (1961)
71. Alliance for Progress (1961)
72. Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)
73. Tonkin Gulf Resolution / Vietnam War
(1964)
74. US Mediation in Six Day War (1967)

90

Events taken from: Herring, George C. 2008. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. New
York: Oxford University Press.
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Finally, Figure 3-D (below) covers the years between 1967 and the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1992. During this period, Model 3 predicts the United states will pursue a
primarily Interventionist Grand Strategy with a Legalist Strategy being the next most likely
outcome. Overall, these predictions were broadly consistent with the observed foreign policy
actions. The major exception to this was the cluster of Legalist events spanning from 1968
through 1975 which collectively represent they policy of détente towards Russia and China and
the attempts to limit nuclear weapons begun by President Johnson and continued under President
Nixon. 91 This was a brief but significant shift in U.S. policy away from Interventionism and
towards Legalism, which shows the limitations of the model’s ability to capture non-rational
influences like in this case the psychological backlash against Interventionism resulting from the
U.S. experience in the Vietnam War.92 However, over time these psychological stresses dissipate
and in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter returns the U.S. to the primarily
Interventionist Grand Strategy predicted by the model.93
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Herring, George C. 2008. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. New York: Oxford
University Press. pp. 760-765.
92

Zelizer, Julian E.2009. Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security from World War II to the War on
Terrorism. New York: Basic Books. Pg. 237-272
93

Ibid at 850-855.
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Major U.S. Foreign Policy Actions:94
75. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968)
76. U.S. Incursion into Cambodia (1970)
77. Termination of Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1970)
78. U.S. Undermining of Allende Government (19701973)
79. Kissinger’s Visit to Beijing (1971)
80. Four Power Agreement on Berlin (1971)
81. Nixon’s Visit to China (1972)
82. Détente, Moscow Summit, ABM and SALT I
Agreements (1972)
83. U.S. Military Withdraws from South Vietnam
(1973)
84. Yom Kippur War (1973)
85. Invasion of Koh Tang Island (1975)
86. Angola Civil War (1975)
87. Helsinki Summit (1975)
88. U.S. Support of Zaire (1977-1978)
89. Panama Canal Treaty (1978)
90. Normalization of U.S.-China Relations (1979)
91. Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan / U.S. aid to Afghan
Rebels / Sanctions on USSR (1979)
92. ‘Carter Doctrine’ (1979)

93. Presidential Directive 59 (1980)
94. Failed Iran Hostage Rescue (1980)
95. ‘Regan Doctrine’ (1980)
96. US Sanctions Poland and USSR (1981)
97. Gulf of Sidra Incident (1981)
98. National Security Decision Directive 75 (1982)
99. CIA Operations in Support of Nicaraguan Contras
(1982-1988)
100. U.S. Intervention in Lebanon (1982-84, 1986)
101. U.S. Invasion of Grenada (1983)
102. U.S. Military Aid to El Salvador (1984)
103. Massive Escalation of U.S. Aid to Afghan Rebels
(1985-1989)
104. Iran-Contra Affair (1986)
105. Reykjavik Summit on Strategic Arms Limitation
(1986)
106. INF Treaty (1987)
107. Reunification of Germany (1990)
108. Operation Desert Storm (1991)
109. START Treaty (1991)
110. Soviet Union Collapses (1991)
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Events taken from: Herring, George C. 2008. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. New
York: Oxford University Press.
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Overall, looking the last hundred years of American foreign policy presented in this
chapter, two things are clear: the first is that U.S. policy during this period is not formulated
randomly and, that with some significant exceptions, it follows a rational and thus predictable
approach. One based not only on relative power variables, but also structural variables and other
societal influences. Furthermore, which set of factors; Rational, Relative, Structural, or Social, is
driving policy will vary at any given time. We also see that for most of its recent history (with
the prominent exception of the isolationist policies of the early 1930’s), the United States has
pursued a combination of Interventionist and Legalist Grand Strategies. This provides support
for structurally limited rational models like Collen Dueck’s “Strategic Culture”95 and describes
U.S. strategy formation during the majority of the time, when the U.S. is operating in a ‘rational’
policy mode. Understanding those periods where the U.S. deviates from rational policy
formation will take significant future research and is beyond the scope of this paper.

95

Dueck, Colin. 2006. Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, Kindle Edition, pp. 13-35
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Chapter 7
Overview of Remaining Model 3 Predictions:
This next chapter will provide a summary of the Model 3 predictions for Grand Strategy
Choice for the remaining great powers in the data set in order of agreement between Model 3’s
predictions and the Observed Grand Strategy Choice Variable. Of these remaining powers, the
nation whose grand strategy was most difficult for Model 3 to predict was Imperial Japan, with
the model successfully predicting the observed strategy approximately 82.5% of the time, when
compared to the Observed Grand Strategy Choice variable.96 While the nation with the greatest
agreement between Model 3’s predictions and the Observed Grand Strategy was Nazi Germany
with Model 3 successfully predicting Nazi Germany’s Grand Strategy choice 100% of the time.
Model 3’s predictions for Imperial Japan are plotted in Figure 4 (below) which covers the
period during which Japan was a great power. Looking at Figure 4 we can see that from the time
Imperial Japan assumes the status of a great power, until its destruction at the end of World War
II, its grand strategy is torn between Isolationist and Revisionist tendencies, often alternating
between the two. This conflict in strategic approach may have been the result of the continuing
power struggle between the Japanese Foreign Ministry and Japanese Military for control of
Imperial Japan’s foreign policy.97

96
97

See Appendix Table A3 for complete list of Observed Grand Strategies and Model 3 Predictions
Nish, Ian. 1977. Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
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Continuing on, Model 3 predicted 84% of the observed grand strategies for the next two
great powers, Imperial Germany (Figure 5 below) and Austria Hungary (Figure 6 below); both of
these powers came to an end after World War 1 although Nazi Germany (which was treated as a
separate power due to the change in government) would briefly recapture great power status and
is discussed later. Looking at the Model 3 predictions for Imperial Germany (Figure 5 below),
we can see that the model predicts Imperial Germany will follow a revisionist grand strategy
from the beginning of period covered by the data and extending until its demise at the end of
World War 1, with the greatest probability of Imperial Germany following an alternate Legalist
strategy occurring in 1917.
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Moving on to the Model predictions for Austria-Hungary (Figure 6 above), we can see
that Model 3 predicts that Austria Hungary will follow a predominantly Legalist Grand Strategy
until 1914, the year Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand is assassinated, and then switch to an
Interventionist Grand Strategy thereafter, which is broadly consistent with Austria-Hungary’s
view of their strategy during this period.98 Keep in mind that while other powers viewed AustriaHungary’s invasion of Serbia as upsetting the status quo, from the Austria-Hungarian
perspective, they were attempting to maintain the status quo in the Balkans.99 Austria-Hungary is
also interesting because while it was a monarchy it was also for much of its history the definition
of a legalist state100, something which we tend to associate more with modern democracies than
with monarchies.
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See: Bridge, F.R. 1972. From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914. London:
Routledge. pp. 310-389
99

Ibid. pp. 380-389

100

Ibid.
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Next is France (Figure 7 above ), with an 87.2% agreement between the Observed Grand
Strategies and the Model 3 Predictions, we can see that except for a brief period at the beginning
of the period covered by the sample, France was predicted to follow a predominantly
Interventionist Grand Strategy and for the most part these predictions closely follow the
Observed Grand Strategy of France during the covered period.101 Although Model 3 slightly
favors an Interventionist policy between 1892 to 1899, the observed policy of France was
Revisionist throughout this period, only switching to Interventionist after a change in
administration in 1899.102 This indicates one of the constraints in relating the models predictions
to real life, often even though the realities underlying a grand strategy may have changed

101

See: Nere, J. 1975. The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945. London: Routledge.
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See: Mayeur, Jean-Marie and Madeleine Reberioux. 1984. The Third Republic From its Origins to The Great War
1871-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. and, Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief. 1985. The Decline of
the Third Republic: 1914-1938. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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(making a change likely), it often takes a change of administration for a new grand strategy to
manifest.

Turning to the models predictions for the Soviet Union (given in Figure 8 above) we can
see that for much of its history Soviet Russia consistently pursued a Revisionist Grand Strategy.
Although Model 3 indicates that there may be some shift in strategy beginning as early as 1980
and becoming increasing likely throughout the decade. This comports well with the Observed
Grand Strategies which have Soviet Russia shifting from a Revisionist to Legalist Strategy
beginning in 1988 and even becoming Interventionist in 1991 right before the final collapse of
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the Soviet Union.103 Finally, Model 3 also included some data for Imperial Russia, but there was
too much missing data for the associated predictions to make a meaningful timeline.104

Figure 9 (above) gives the Model 3 predictions for the United Kingdom from the
beginning of the period covered by the study and continuing until its loss of great power status
towards the end of the 1940’s. Throughout this period the model predicts that United Kingdom
will follow an Interventionist Grand Strategy and this agrees perfectly with the Observed Grand
Strategies, but with one exception: in 1937 the observed grand strategy was Legalist rather than
Interventionist.105 Taken together it is interesting to note that all three of democracies examined,
especially Great Britain and France (both parliamentary democracies) heavily favored
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Interventionist Grand Strategies, something borne out by both Model 3 and its associated
Predictions.

Finally, the Observed Grand Strategy of the last Great Power examined in the data set,
Nazi Germany, was perfectly predicted by Model 3. The Model 3 predictions for Nazi Germany
are given in Table 10 (above). It is perhaps of no surprise that throughout its brief existence as a
great power, Nazi Germany was predicted to follow a Revisionist Grand Strategy. 106 What is
surprising is that Model 3 gives the probability that Nazi Germany will engage in a Revisionist
Grand Strategy as nearly 100% as early as 1936 (three years before the invasion of Poland), and
makes this prediction using data from 1935. This is a great example of the potential utility of a
statistical model of Grand Strategy Choice not only because it could provide warning that a state
is adopting a revisionist strategy in advance, but also because it can indicate that there were
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significant underlying structural and relative power factors which were pushing Germany
towards adopting a Revisionist Grand Strategy.
This chapter provides the Model 3 predictions for the other great powers included in the
study and in doing so demonstrates one of the primary advantages of this kind of quantitative
research, namely the ability of a single model based on empirical data to be able to predict a
great deal (although by no means all) of great power behavior, even though there are clear
differences in the specific approaches adopted by each great power. Of particular interest to this
study’s overall goals is the success Model 3 has at predicting the revisionist behavior of Nazi
Germany and other revisionist states.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion:
This research was intended as an initial step toward determining what role, if any, relative
military and economic strength plays in grand strategy choice. More specifically it asks the
question: do relative military and economic power determine strategy choice? To put it simply
the answer to this question is yes, military and economic variables help determine grand strategy
choice, but these are by no means the only variables which play a roll, as structural and other
variables do so as well.
To answer this question this study used three statistical models, a multivariate logistic
regression model (Model 1), a multivariate ordinary least squares model (Model 2) and a time
series multinomial logit model (Model 3). The first hypothesis (𝐻1 ) was that as Relative
Economic Power increases, countries will have a higher probability of choosing Pro Status Quo
strategies (Interventionism and Legalism). This hypothesis was directly addressed by Model 1,
which did not find any statistically significant link between Relative Economic Power (either in
terms of Relative GDP or Relative Per Capita GDP) and whether a nation adopted a Pro or Anti
Status Quo Grand Strategy the following year. However, Model 1 did find that Relative Military
Expenditures Per Military Personnel had both a statistical and structurally significant effect on
the odds of a nation adopting an Anti-Status Quo Grand Strategy the following year; with a one
unit increase in Relative Military Expenditures per Military Personnel increasing the odds of
pursuing an Anti-Status Quo Grand Strategy the following year by a factor of 11.9. Looking at
the implications of this result for the other theories examined, the effect of Relative Military
Expenditures per Personnel provides statistical evidence for the operation of some form of
offense – defense balance and corresponding security dilemma, as proposed by Robert Jervis. In
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particular, Model 1 indicates a strong link between the way a great power’s military is
configured (with regard to high or low Expenditures per Personnel) and whether a power will
pursue Pro or Anti Status Quo strategy the following year. 107
Looking at the Model 1 implications for other related theories, a one unit increase in a
Great Powers age corresponded to a 15% reduction in the odds of choosing an anti-status quo
strategy the following year. This provides support for Organski and Kugler’s conclusions in The
War Ledger, as younger, rising powers were statistically and substantively more likely to
implement Anti-status Quo Grand Strategies compared to older, more established great
powers.108 Finally, looking at Model 1’s implications for democratic peace theory, the Model
found that Parliamentary Democracies were 99.9 percent more likely to choose a pro status quo
policy the following year than Monarchies, with all other factors being equal, while the evidence
was less clear for Presidential Democracies. Still, this provides further statistical support for
democratic peace Theory.109
Moving on to Model 2, my second hypothesis (𝐻2 ) was that as Relative Military Power
increases, countries are more likely to choose High Risk strategies (namely Interventionism or
Revisionism). This Hypothesis was directly tested by Model 2 which found that while the
Relative Military Power variables (except for Relative Military Personnel) were statistically
significant predictors of how much Risk of Major War a great power would assume the
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following year; their effects were opposed. Model 2 found that increases in Relative
Expenditures per Military Personnel corresponded to a greater Risk of Major War the following
year, but increases in overall Relative Military Expenditures had the opposite effect, reducing the
Risk of War. However, while the effects of the Relative Military Power Variables were
somewhat ambiguous, the effects of the Relative Economic Power Variables were not. Both
Relative Economic Power variables were statistically and substantively significant, and both
linked increased Relative Economic Power to greater Risk of Major War the following year. This
lead to the unexpected result that the most influential relative power variables in each model
were switched from what the hypotheses predicted; with Relative Military Power influencing
whether a nation will be Pro vs. Anti-Status quo and Relative Economic Power increasing the
Risk of Major War a great power is prepared to accept.
Looking at Model 2’s implications for other theories, starting with offensive Realism, we
can see that the results are mixed. While the positive link between the Relative Economic Power
variables and Risk of Major War support the theory, the negative relationship between increased
Relative Military Expenditures and Risk argues against it. Far less ambiguous is Model 2’s
support for the effect of some sort of offense-defense balance operating in great power politics,
with a clear link between higher Relative Expenditures per Military Personnel and an increased
Risk of Major War the following year. Similarly, the positive relationship between increased
economic power and increased Risk of Major War, provides strong support for Organski and
Kugler’s conclusion that hegemonic wars are likely to occur when a rising power overtakes the
power of the dominant nation.110 Finally, Model 2 provides strong substantive and statistically
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significant support for democratic peace theory with both Presidential Democracies and
Parliamentary Democracies being associated with reduced Risk of Major War.
Examining Model 3, we can see that the effect of Relative Military power on Grand
Strategy Choice is very complex, with increases in either Relative Expenditures Per Personnel or
Relative Number of Military Personnel increasing the odds that a great power will choose a nonLegalist Grand Strategy. This tendency is somewhat offset by the positive relationship between
overall Relative Military Expenditures and pursuing a Legalist Grand Strategy. Furthermore,
when these military variables come into conflict, the effect of the Relative Number Military
Personnel is likely to dominate the other two, providing some additional evidence that force
structure may have a significant impact on strategy choice, as one would expect from Jervis’s
offense-defense balance. 111
Looking at the impact of the economic variables, we see that both show a positive
relationship between greater economic strength and the adoption of a Revisionist Grand Strategy,
providing some evidence for ‘offensive realism’ but one tempered by the positive relationship
between increased Relative Military Expenditures and following a Legalist Grand Strategy the
next year. On the other hand, the effects of the relative economic variables provide clear support
for Organski and Kugler’s theory that a rising power is more likely to adopt a Revisionist Grand
Strategy. Furthermore, the type of economy within which one operates matters. For example,
Mercantilist Economies have a very strong propensity for pursuing Revisionist Grand Strategies.
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Moving on to an examination of the political variables in Model 3, there is some
significant support for the Democratic Peace Theory. With Presidential democracies strongly
preferring Low Risk strategies (Isolationism and Legalism) when compared to Monarchies, and
Parliamentary Democracies favoring Interventionist Grand Strategies over Legalist ones. Next,
Dictatorship had the opposite effect, strongly favoring Revisionist Grand Strategies, when
compared to Monarchies, all other factors being equal. Furthermore, as Polity 2 score increases
we see an increasing preference for Legalist over Revisionist Grand Strategies.
Finally, we see that both Homeland Vulnerability and Nation Age had statistically and
substantively significant effects, with both acting to increase the odds a great power will follow a
Legalist Grand Strategy the following year. The link between Nation Age and Legalist Grand
Strategies provides additional support for both Organski and Kugler’s arguments about the role
of younger powers in major wars. 112 While the effects of Homeland Vulnerability provides clear
evidence for the existence of some form of Robert Jervis’s ‘Security Dilemma.’113
Examining the overall results of all of the models taken together, this study concludes
that both relative military and relative economic power have significant effects on Grand
Strategy Choice; however, they are far from the only variables which do so. Structural variables
such as Government Type, Homeland Vulnerability, and others were also statistically significant
predictors of strategy choice. In addition, the effects of relative military power in particular, were
more nuanced than initially expected. Thus, Model 3 provides important evidence in favor of the
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hybrid theories of strategy formation such as those put forward by Trubowitz (2011), Dueck
(2006), Narizny (2007) and others, while hopefully providing some clarity on the complex way
realist and other factors interact. For example, in the case of the United States, detailed analysis
of the data demonstrates that internal variables work primarily to limit the acceptable strategy
choices, while specific strategies are then chosen from the acceptable options based on a
country’s strategic position at the time. This is in many ways similar to Dueck’s “strategic
culture” (2006), but with different underpinnings. This interaction is then further complicated
during periods of great societal stress, during which policy may shift from the predicted
approach for a period of time before snapping back to the predicted approach after several years.
In addition, the three statistical models also provide some statistical evidence in support of
democratic peace theory, Jervis’ security dilemma (including the idea of offense - defense
balance),114 as well as Organski and Kugler’s theory of great power conflict.115
With respect to future research, it may be time for us as a field to move beyond the realist
vs. constructivist debate and into one focused on understanding when and where each of these
factors have their greatest impact. There by beginning the process of translating all the work on
grand strategy that researchers have spent years of effort accumulating into a comprehensive
whole with the potential to have a real impact on the challenges we face. With respect to the
future of this research, it will be important to find ways to expand both the number of countries
represented in the data, and the time period covered, in order to improve the model’s accuracy
and generalizability. It is also critical to expand the model beyond Great Power states; of
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particular interest are second rank and regional powers due to the important role they play in
many of today’s most difficult international relations issues. It is also of utmost importance to
find some way to capture the effects of societal stress in the model and to develop a theory to
better explain its interaction with the overall rational model. Finally, future research should
consider additional independent variables to better represent both the realist as well as the myriad
constructivist models of grand strategy formation.
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Appendix:
 Statistically Significant Model 3 Results Given in table A1 (below).
 Complete Model 3 results given in table A2a – A2b (below).

 Complete List of Observed Grand Strategies and Model 3 Predictions given
in Table A3 (below).
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Table A1: Model 3; Statistically Significant Effects of Tested Variables on Grand
Strategy Choice the Following Year
Coefficient

Z Score

P > |z|

% Change

Legalist vs. Interventionist

-1.97

-2.095

0.036

-86.1

Legalist vs. Revisionist

-3.48

-3.697

0.000

-96.9

Interventionist vs. Legalist

1.97

2.095

0.036

619.1

Revisionist vs. Legalist

3.48

3.696

0.000

3149.9

Legalist vs. Isolationist

-8.77

-3.111

0.002

-100.0

Legalist vs. Interventionist

-3.80

-2.433

0.015

-97.8

Legalist vs. Revisionist

-4.92

-3.145

0.002

-99.3

Isolationist vs. Legalist

8.77

3.111

0.002

643467.1

Interventionist vs. Legalist

3.80

2.433

0.015

4369.4

Revisionist vs. Legalist

4.92

3.061

0.002

13488.7

Legalist vs. Interventionist

2.62

2.541

0.011

1274.4

Legalist vs. Revisionist

1.75

1.695

0.090

474.5

Interventionist vs. Legalist

-2.62

-2.541

0.011

-92.7

Revisionist vs. Legalist

-1.75

-1.839

0.066

-82.6

Legalist vs. Isolationist

10.57

2.779

0.005

3.9x10^6

Legalist vs. Revisionist

3.52

3.639

0.000

3281.3

Isolationist vs. Legalist

-10.57

-2.779

0.005

-100.0

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

10.47

-3.224

0.001

-100.0

Isolationist vs Revisionist

-7.05

-2.171

0.030

-99.9

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

10.47

3.224

0.001

3.5x10^6

Revisionist vs. Legalist

-3.52

-3.703

0.000

-97.0

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

7.05

2.183

0.029

115436.3

Revisionist vs. Interventionist

-3.42

-5.938

0.000

-96.7

Rel. Expend. Per Personnel

Relative Military Personnel

Relative Military Expenditure

Homeland Vulnerability
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Coefficient

Z Score

P > |z|

% Change

-4.25

-4.801

0.000

-98.6

5.87

2.097

0.036

35313.8

Legalist vs. Revisionist

9.23

2.389

0.017

1.0x10^6

Revisionist vs. Legalist

-9.21

-1.799

0.072

-100.0

1.62

1.890

0.059

404.8

Legalist vs. Revisionist

-10.78

-12.579

0.000

-100.0

Interventionist vs. Legalist

-1.62

-1.890

0.059

-80.2

Legalist vs. Isolationist

-45.47

-3.808

0.000

-100

Legalist vs. Revisionist

12.49

4.327

0.000

2.7x10^7

Isolationist vs. Legalist

45.47

3.808

0.000

5.6x10^21

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

43.46

3.381

0.001

7.5x10^20

Isolationist vs Revisionist

57.96

4.509

0.000

1.5x10^27

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

-43.46

-3.381

0.001

-100.0

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

-57.96

-5.838

0.000

-100.0

Legalist vs. Interventionist

-5.31

-4.408

0.000

-99.5

Interventionist vs. Legalist

5.31

4.408

0.000

20139.7

Legalist vs. Revisionist

-10.68

-7.004

0.000

-100.0

Revisionist vs. Legalist

10.68

2.576

0.010

4.4x10^6

Revisionist vs. Interventionist

9.01

2.182

0.029

819109.0

0.32

2.359

0.018

38.3

Relative GDP
Legalist vs. Revisionist
Relative GDP Per Capita
Revisionist vs. Isolationist
Primarily Marxist Economy

Primarily Mercantilist Economy
Legalist vs. Interventionist

Presidential Democracy

Parliamentary Democracy

Dictatorship

Polity 2 Score
Legalist vs. Revisionist
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Coefficient

Z Score

P > |z|

% Change

Legalist vs. Isolationist

0.2162

1.952

0.051

24.1

Legalist vs. Revisionist

0.09

7.634

0.000

9.3

Isolationist vs. Legalist

-0.22

-1.95

0.051

-19.4

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

-0.22

-2.073

0.038

-19.9

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

0.22

2.073

0.038

24.8

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

0.13

1.956

0.050

13.6

Number of Observations

366

Nation Age

Pseudo R-squared

0.6789

Pseudo Log Likelihood

-145.63

Notes:
*Base Government Type was Monarchy, **Base Economic System was Liberal
Data derived from:
Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ Press,
Maddison, Angus (2006) The World Economy: Volume 1: A Millennial Perspective and Volume 2
Historical Statistics. OECD Development Centre,
Polity Project: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html

96

Table A2a: Model 3a; Effect of Relative Military Power on Grand Strategy
Choice the Following Year
Coefficient

Z Score

P > |z|

% Change

Legalist vs. Isolationist

-1.28

-0.465

0.642

-72.2

Legalist vs. Interventionist

-1.97

-2.095

0.036

-86.1

Legalist vs. Revisionist

-3.48

-3.697

0.000

-96.9

Isolationist vs. Legalist

1.28

0.465

0.642

260.3

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

-0.69

-0.292

0.770

-49.9

Isolationist vs Revisionist

-2.20

-0.930

0.352

-88.9

Interventionist vs. Legalist

1.97

2.095

0.036

619.1

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

0.69

0.292

0.770

99.6

Revisionist vs. Legalist

3.48

3.696

0.000

3149.9

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

2.20

0.613

0.540

802.0

Revisionist vs. Interventionist

1.51

0.900

0.368

352.0

Legalist vs. Isolationist

-8.77

-3.111

0.002

-100.0

Legalist vs. Interventionist

-3.80

-2.433

0.015

-97.8

Legalist vs. Revisionist

-4.92

-3.145

0.002

-99.3

Isolationist vs. Legalist

8.77

3.111

0.002

643467.1

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

4.97

1.418

0.156

14299.5

Isolationist vs Revisionist

3.86

1.101

0.271

4636.1

Interventionist vs. Legalist

3.80

2.433

0.015

4369.4

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

-4.97

-1.418

0.156

-99.3

Revisionist vs. Legalist

4.92

3.061

0.002

13488.7

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

-3.86

-1.448

0.148

-97.9

Revisionist vs. Interventionist

1.11

0.543

0.587

204.0

Legalist vs. Isolationist

0.50

0.262

0.793

64.7

Legalist vs. Interventionist

2.62

2.541

0.011

1274.4

Legalist vs. Revisionist

1.75

1.695

0.090

474.5

Rel. Expend. Per Personnel

Relative Military Personnel

Relative Military Expenditure

97

Isolationist vs. Legalist

-0.50

-0.262

0.793

-39.3

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

2.12

1.118

0.263

734.4

Isolationist vs Revisionist

1.25

0.659

0.510

248.8

Interventionist vs. Legalist

-2.62

-2.541

0.011

-92.7

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

-2.12

-1.118

0.263

-88.0

Revisionist vs. Legalist

-1.75

-1.839

0.066

-82.6

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

-1.25

-0.651

0.515

-71.3

Revisionist vs. Interventionist

0.87

0.678

0.498

139.2

Legalist vs. Isolationist

10.57

2.779

0.005

3.9x10^6

Legalist vs. Interventionist

0.10

0.102

0.919

10.4

Legalist vs. Revisionist

3.52

3.639

0.000

3281.3

Isolationist vs. Legalist

-10.57

-2.779

0.005

-100.0

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

10.47

-3.224

0.001

-100.0

Isolationist vs Revisionist

-7.05

-2.171

0.030

-99.9

Interventionist vs. Legalist

-0.10

-0.102

0.919

-9.4

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

10.47

3.224

0.001

3.5x10^6

Revisionist vs. Legalist

-3.52

-3.703

0.000

-97.0

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

7.05

2.183

0.029

115436.3

Revisionist vs. Interventionist

-3.42

-5.938

0.000

-96.7

Number of Observations

366

Homeland Vulnerability

Pseudo R-squared

0.6789

Pseudo Log Likelihood

-145.63
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Table A2b: Model 3b; Effect of Relative Economic Power on Grand Strategy
Choice the Following Year
Coefficient

Z Score

P > |z|

% Change

Legalist vs. Isolationist

11.45

0.786

0.432

9.4x10^6

Legalist vs. Interventionist

0.98

1.107

0.268

166.4

Legalist vs. Revisionist

-4.25

-4.801

0.000

-98.6

Isolationist vs. Legalist

-11.45

-0.786

0.432

-100.0

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

-10.47

-0.688

0.491

-100.0

Isolationist vs Revisionist

-15.70

-1.032

0.302

-100.0

Interventionist vs. Legalist

-0.98

-1.107

0.268

-62.5

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

10.47

0.688

0.491

3.5x10^6

Revisionist vs. Legalist

4.25

1.005

0.315

6919.2

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

15.70

1.279

0.201

6.6x10^8

Revisionist vs. Interventionist

5.23

1.042

0.297

18597.9

Legalist vs. Isolationist

7.12

0.943

0.346

124066.0

Legalist vs. Interventionist

1.20

0.263

0.792

232.0

Legalist vs. Revisionist

1.25

0.275

0.783

250.6

Isolationist vs. Legalist

-7.12

-0.943

0.346

-99.9

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

-5.92

-1.44

0.150

-99.7

Isolationist vs Revisionist

-5.87

-1.43

0.154

-99.7

Interventionist vs. Legalist

-1.20

-0.263

0.792

-69.9

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

5.92

1.441

0.150

37303.7

Revisionist vs. Legalist

-1.25

-0.199

0.842

-71.5

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

5.87

2.097

0.036

35313.8

Revisionist vs. Interventionist

-0.05

-0.019

0.985

-5.3

Legalist vs. Isolationist

20.95

0.978

0.328

1.2x10^11

Legalist vs. Interventionist

4.49

1.164

0.244

8815.1

Legalist vs. Revisionist

9.23

2.389

0.017

1.0x10^6

Relative GDP

Relative GDP Per Capita

Primarily Marxist Economy
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Isolationist vs. Legalist

-20.94

-0.978

0.328

-100.0

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

-16.45

-0.878

0.380

-100.0

Isolationist vs Revisionist

-11.73

-0.626

0.531

-100.0

Interventionist vs. Legalist

-4.49

-1.164

0.244

-98.9

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

16.45

0.878

0.380

1.4x10^9

Revisionist vs. Legalist

-9.21

-1.799

0.072

-100.0

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

11.73

0.508

0.612

1.2x10^7

Revisionist vs. Interventionist

-4.72

-0.645

0.519

-99.1

-13.57

-0.915

0.360

-100.0

1.62

1.890

0.059

404.8

Legalist vs. Revisionist

-10.78

-12.579

0.000

-100.0

Isolationist vs. Legalist

13.57

0.915

0.360

7.8x10^7

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

15.19

1.057

0.290

3.9x10^8

Isolationist vs Revisionist

2.79

0.194

0.846

1530.0

Interventionist vs. Legalist

-1.62

-1.890

0.059

-80.2

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

-15.19

-1.057

0.290

-100.0

Revisionist vs. Legalist

10.78

1.211

0.226

4.8x10^6

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

-2.80

-0.143

0.887

-93.9

Revisionist vs. Interventionist

12.40

1.318

0.188

2.4x10^7

Primarily Mercantilist Economy
Legalist vs. Isolationist
Legalist vs. Interventionist

Number of Observations

366

Pseudo R-squared

0.6789

Pseudo Log Likelihood

-145.63
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Table A2c: Model 3c; Effect of Government Variables on Grand Strategy Choice
the Following Year
Coefficient

Z Score

P > |z|

% Change

Legalist vs. Isolationist

-45.47

-3.808

0.000

-100

Legalist vs. Interventionist

-2.01

-0.695

0.487

-86.6

Legalist vs. Revisionist

12.49

4.327

0.000

2.7x10^7

Isolationist vs. Legalist

45.47

3.808

0.000

5.6x10^21

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

43.46

3.381

0.001

7.5x10^20

Isolationist vs Revisionist

57.96

4.509

0.000

1.5x10^27

Interventionist vs. Legalist

2.01

0.695

0.487

644.3

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

-43.46

-3.381

0.001

-100.0

Revisionist vs. Legalist

-12.49

-1.599

0.110

-100.0

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

-57.96

-5.838

0.000

-100.0

Revisionist vs. Interventionist

-14.50

-1.601

0.109

-100.0

Legalist vs. Isolationist

1.68

0.081

0.935

436.9

Legalist vs. Interventionist

-5.31

-4.408

0.000

-99.5

Legalist vs. Revisionist

-0.79

-0.653

0.514

-54.5

Isolationist vs. Legalist

-1.68

-0.081

0.935

-81.4

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

-6.99

-0.333

0.739

-99.9

Isolationist vs Revisionist

-2.47

-0.117

0.907

-91.5

Interventionist vs. Legalist

5.31

4.408

0.000

20139.7

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

6.99

0.333

0.739

108568.9

Revisionist vs. Legalist

0.79

0.228

0.820

119.6

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

2.47

0.133

0.895

1078.9

Revisionist vs. Interventionist

-4.52

-1.177

0.239

-98.9

Legalist vs. Isolationist

22.56

0.892

0.372

6.3x10^11

Legalist vs. Interventionist

-1.67

-1.097

0.272

-81.2

Legalist vs. Revisionist

-10.68

-7.004

0.000

-100.0

Presidential Democracy

Parliamentary Democracy

Dictatorship
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Isolationist vs. Legalist

-22.56

-0.892

0.372

-100.0

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

-24.23

-0.968

0.333

-100.0

Isolationist vs Revisionist

-33.24

-1.328

0.184

-100.0

Interventionist vs. Legalist

1.67

1.097

0.272

433.3

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

24.23

0.968

0.333

3.3x10^12

Revisionist vs. Legalist

10.68

2.576

0.010

4.4x10^6

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

33.24

1.397

0.163

2.7x10^16

Revisionist vs. Interventionist

9.01

2.182

0.029

819109.0

Legalist vs. Isolationist

2.13

0.887

0.375

743.4

Legalist vs. Interventionist

0.03

0.202

0.840

2.8

Legalist vs. Revisionist

0.32

2.359

0.018

38.3

Isolationist vs. Legalist

-2.13

-0.887

0.375

-88.1

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

-2.10

-0.874

0.382

-87.8

Isolationist vs Revisionist

-1.81

-0.751

0.453

-83.6

Interventionist vs. Legalist

-0.03

-0.202

0.840

-2.7

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

2.10

0.874

0.382

720.3

Revisionist vs. Legalist

-0.32

-0.687

0.492

-27.7

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

1.81

0.848

0.397

510.0

Revisionist vs. Interventionist

-0.30

-0.604

0.546

-25.6

Number of Observations

366

Polity 2 Score

Pseudo R-squared

0.6789

Pseudo Log Likelihood

-145.63
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Table A2d: Model 3d; Effect of Other Variables on Grand Strategy Choice the
Following Year
Coefficient

Z Score

P > |z|

% Change

0.2162

1.952

0.051

24.1

Legalist vs. Interventionist

-0.01

-0.476

0.634

-0.6

Legalist vs. Revisionist

0.09

7.634

0.000

9.3

Isolationist vs. Legalist

-0.22

-1.95

0.051

-19.4

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

-0.22

-2.073

0.038

-19.9

Isolationist vs Revisionist

-0.13

-1.189

0.235

-11.9

Interventionist vs. Legalist

0.01

0.476

0.634

0.6

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

0.22

2.073

0.038

24.8

Revisionist vs. Legalist

-0.09

-1.155

0.248

-8.5

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

0.13

1.956

0.050

13.6

Revisionist vs. Interventionist

-0.09

-1.277

0.202

-9.0

Legalist vs. Isolationist

-0.05

-0.494

0.621

-4.7

Legalist vs. Interventionist

0.01

0.274

0.784

0.9

Legalist vs. Revisionist

-0.03

-0.845

0.398

-2.6

Isolationist vs. Legalist

0.05

0.494

0.621

4.9

Isolationist vs. Interventionist

0.06

0.725

0.469

5.8

Isolationist vs Revisionist

0.02

0.275

0.784

2.2

Interventionist vs. Legalist

-0.01

-0.274

0.784

-0.9

Interventionist vs. Isolationist

-0.06

-0.725

0.469

-5.5

Revisionist vs. Legalist

0.03

1.325

0.185

2.7

Revisionist vs. Isolationist

-0.02

-0.220

0.826

-2.1

Revisionist vs. Interventionist

0.03

0.791

0.429

3.6

Number of Observations

366

Nation Age
Legalist vs. Isolationist

Years Since Last Major War

Pseudo R-squared

0.6789

Pseudo Log Likelihood

-145.63
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Table A3
State
Abb.
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
AUH
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN

Year
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903

Administration
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Francis Joseph I
Charles I
Charles I
Marie Francois Sadi Carnot
Marie Francois Sadi Carnot
Jean Casimir-Perier
Felix Faure
Felix Faure
Felix Faure
Felix Faure
Emile Loubet
Emile Loubet
Emile Loubet
Emile Loubet
Emile Loubet

Observed Grand Strategy
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Revisionist
Isolationist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist

Model 3 Predicted
Strategy
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
104

FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
FRN
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)

1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897

Emile Loubet
Emile Loubet
Armand Fllieres
Armand Fllieres
Armand Fllieres
Armand Fllieres
Armand Fllieres
Armand Fllieres
Armand Fllieres
Raymond Poincare
Raymond Poincare
Raymond Poincare
Raymond Poincare
Raymond Poincare
Raymond Poincare
Raymond Poincare
Paul Deschanel
Alexandre Millerand
Alexandre Millerand
Alexandre Millerand
Gaston Doumergue
Gaston Doumergue
Gaston Doumergue
Gaston Doumergue
Gaston Doumergue
Gaston Doumergue
Gaston Doumergue
Paul Doumer
Albert Lebrun
Albert Lebrun
Albert Lebrun
Albert Lebrun
Albert Lebrun
Albert Lebrun
Albert Lebrun
Albert Lebrun
Albert Lebrun
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II

Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Revisionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Revisionist

Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
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GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(I)
GMY(N)
GMY(N)
GMY(N)
GMY(N)
GMY(N)
GMY(N)
GMY(N)
GMY(N)
GMY(N)
GMY(N)
GMY(N)
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN

1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915

Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Wilhelm II
Adolf Hitler
Adolf Hitler
Adolf Hitler
Adolf Hitler
Adolf Hitler
Adolf Hitler
Adolf Hitler
Adolf Hitler
Adolf Hitler
Adolf Hitler
Adolf Hitler
Katsura Taro
Saionji Kinmochi
Saionji Kinmochi
Saionji Kinmochi
Katsura Taro
Katsura Taro
Katsura Taro
Saionji Kinmochi
Yamamoto Gonnohyoe
Okuma Shigenobu
Okuma Shigenobu

Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Revisionist
Revisionist

Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
106

JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
JPN
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)

1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904

Okuma Shigenobu
Terauchi Masatake
Terauchi Masatake
Hara Takashi
Hara Takashi
Hara Takashi
Takahashi Korekiyo
Kato Tomosaburo
Kato Takaaki
Kato Takaaki
Wakatsuki Reijiro
Tanaka Giichi
Tanaka Giichi
Tanaka Giichi
Osachi Hamaguchi
Wakatsuki Reijiro
Saito Makoto
Saito Makoto
Keisuki Okada
Keisuki Okada
Koki Hirota
Fumimaro Konoe
Fumimaro Konoe
Hiranuma Kiichiro
Mitsumasa Yonai
Fumimaro Konoe
Hideki Tojo
Hideki Tojo
Hideki Tojo
Kuniaki Koiso
Alexander III
Alexander III
Alexander III
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II

Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Revisionist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist

Isolationist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist

Interventionist
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RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(I)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)

1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951

Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Nicholas II
Vladimir Lenin
Vladimir Lenin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin

Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist

Interventionist

Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist

Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
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RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
RUS(S)
UKG
UKG
UKG

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1892
1893
1894

Joseph Stalin
Georgy Malenkov
Georgy Malenkov
Nikita Khruschev
Nikita Khruschev
Nikita Khruschev
Nikita Khruschev
Nikita Khruschev
Nikita Khruschev
Nikita Khruschev
Nikita Khruschev
Nikita Khruschev
Nikita Khruschev
Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev
Yuri Andropov
Konstantin Chernenko
Mikhail Gorbachev
Mikhail Gorbachev
Mikhail Gorbachev
Mikhail Gorbachev
Mikhail Gorbachev
Mikhail Gorbachev
Mikhail Gorbachev
William Gladstone
William Gladstone
Archibald Primrose

Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Interventionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist

Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Revisionist
Legalist
Interventionist
Interventionist
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UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG

1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937

Archibald Primrose
Robert Gascoyne-Cecil
Robert Gascoyne-Cecil
Robert Gascoyne-Cecil
Robert Gascoyne-Cecil
Robert Gascoyne-Cecil
Robert Gascoyne-Cecil
Robert Gascoyne-Cecil
Arthor Balfour
Arthor Balfour
Arthor Balfour
Henry Campbell-Bannerman
Henry Campbell-Bannerman
Herbert Asquith
Herbert Asquith
Herbert Asquith
Herbert Asquith
Herbert Asquith
Herbert Asquith
Herbert Asquith
Herbert Asquith
Herbert Asquith
Loyd George
Loyd George
Loyd George
Loyd George
Loyd George
Loyd George
Stanley Baldwin
Ramsay MacDonald
Stanley Baldwin
Stanley Baldwin
Stanley Baldwin
Stanley Baldwin
Ramsay MacDonald
Ramsay MacDonald
Ramsay MacDonald
Ramsay MacDonald
Ramsay MacDonald
Ramsay MacDonald
Stanley Baldwin
Stanley Baldwin
Neville Chamberlain

Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Legalist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist

Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
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UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
UKG
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA

1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922

Neville Chamberlain
Neville Chamberlain
Winston Churchill
Winston Churchill
Winston Churchill
Winston Churchill
Winston Churchill
Winston Churchill
Clement Attlee
Clement Attlee
Clement Attlee
Clement Attlee
Benjamin Harrison
Grover Clevland
Grover Clevland
Grover Clevland
Grover Clevland
William McKinley
William McKinley
William McKinley
William McKinley
William McKinley
Theodore Roosevelt
Theodore Roosevelt
Theodore Roosevelt
Theodore Roosevelt
Theodore Roosevelt
Theodore Roosevelt
Theodore Roosevelt
William H. Taft
William H. Taft
William H. Taft
William H. Taft
Woodrow Wilson
Woodrow Wilson
Woodrow Wilson
Woodrow Wilson
Woodrow Wilson
Woodrow Wilson
Woodrow Wilson
Woodrow Wilson
Warren G. Harding
Warren G. Harding

Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Revisionist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist

Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Isolationist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist

Legalist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
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USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA

1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965

Warren G. Harding
Calvin Coolidge
Calvin Coolidge
Calvin Coolidge
Calvin Coolidge
Calvin Coolidge
Herbert Hoover
Herbert Hoover
Herbert Hoover
Herbert Hoover
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Harry S. Truman
Harry S. Truman
Harry S. Truman
Harry S. Truman
Harry S. Truman
Harry S. Truman
Harry S. Truman
Harry S. Truman
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Dwight D. Eisenhower
John F Kennedy
John F Kennedy
John F Kennedy
Lyndon B. Johnson
Lyndon B. Johnson

Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Legalist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist

Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
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USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Lyndon B. Johnson
Lyndon B. Johnson
Lyndon B. Johnson
Richard M. Nixon
Richard M. Nixon
Richard M. Nixon
Richard M. Nixon
Richard M. Nixon
Richard M. Nixon
Gerald R. Ford
Gerald R. Ford
Jimmy Carter
Jimmy Carter
Jimmy Carter
Jimmy Carter
Ronald Reagan
Ronald Reagan
Ronald Reagan
Ronald Reagan
Ronald Reagan
Ronald Reagan
Ronald Reagan
Ronald Reagan
George Bush
George Bush
George Bush
George Bush
Bill Clinton
Bill Clinton
Bill Clinton
Bill Clinton
Bill Clinton
Bill Clinton
Bill Clinton
Bill Clinton
George W. Bush
George W. Bush
George W. Bush
George W. Bush
George W. Bush
George W. Bush
George W. Bush
George W. Bush

Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist

Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
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USA
USA
USA
USA

2009
2010
2011
2012

Barack Obama
Barack Obama
Barack Obama
Barack Obama

Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
Interventionist
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